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GEORGE'S STORY: VOICE AND
TRANSFORMATION THROUGH THE TEACHING
AND PRACTICE OF THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE IN A LAW SCHOOL
CHILD ADVOCACY CLINIC
BERNARD P. PERLMUTTER*
How many times do our own children, well past the age of eighteen, seek
us out for advice, for money, or for a soothing word? What kind of a mes-
sage do we send, as a society, if emancipation from foster care means no
second chances, no room to learn from mistakes, no helping hand?
President Jimmy Carter'
A recurrent theme in their comments was the importance of consulting
with children and allowing them to share in, and contribute to, decisions
that need to be made. By age ten or early teens 'children should be able to
have a voice in where they are placed. .. if a kid is old enough to be trans-
ferred around like a ping-pong ball he's old enough to decide where he's
happy.., children in foster care grow up very quickly.'
Trudy Festinger2
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CLIENT INTERVIEW
On our first visit with our new client, George C.,3 at the start of the
Fall 2001 semester, two students from the University of Miami School of
Law's Children & Youth Law Clinic4 and I found a soft-spoken and shy
*Assistant Professor of Clinical Legal Education and Director, University of Miami School of
Law, Children & Youth Law Clinic. I am grateful to Pamela Chamberlin, Gerard Glynn, David
Wexler, and Bruce Winick for their comments and support. I also wish to thank Chad Shimel for
his research assistance and for his work (and journal comments) in George's case while interning
in the Children & Youth Law Clinic. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Ruth Perlmutter
Kates ("e non n "ombra, o gentile, non ci ehe tu credi ").
1. Jimmy Carter, Foreword to MARTHA SHIRK & GARY STANGLER, ON THEIR OWN:
WHAT HAPPENS TO KIDS WHEN THEY AGE OUT OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM? viii (2004).
2. TRUDY FESTINGER, NO ONE EVER ASKED US... A POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE 281
(1983).
3. Client's first name and story used with his permission.
4. The Children & Youth Law Clinic is a live-client clinic established in 1995 by the law
school. Supervised by two clinical instructors, the Clinic serves the legal needs of older children
in the foster care system in dependency, health care, mental health, disability, independent living,
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fifteen year old. He was living in a locked psychiatric hospital where he
had been placed over fifteen months earlier by a social worker from the
Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF). Other than his DCF
social worker and his mother, each of whom had visited him in the facility
only intermittently, we were his first visitors from the outside in a very
long time.
It was difficult to have a quiet conversation with him in the small
room loaned to us by his therapist in the program. In the recreation room
just outside the therapist's office, the other teenage patients were watching
a loud television and engaging in horseplay. The hospital's mental health
"techs" would occasionally yell at them to quiet down when their adoles-
cent enthusiasm got out of control, and we heard several arguments and
fights just outside the door. Despite these distractions, our new client
seemed eager to open up and share his life story with three strangers. He
gave a chronologically accurate account of his recent history and conveyed
some of his feelings of frustration about his isolation from his family and
the outside world in this institution where he had spent the previous fifteen
months.'
We came away from our first meeting with a little information about
our client and a sense of what he hoped we would help him achieve.
George gave each of us a drawing that he made for us during this first in-
terview. I still have my pencil drawing in his legal file at the Clinic. It de-
picts a character called Dragonball Z, a fearsome super action figure from a
world of television, the Internet, and card games inhabited by teenagers and
preteens.6
education, immigration and other general civil legal matters, ensuring that they have a voice in
the court proceedings, and engages in impact litigation, law reform advocacy, and community
lawyering on their behalf.
5. Here is what Prabhath, the first of several law students who worked on George's case,
wrote:
George presented himself as very bright and intelligent and knew his case history
very well. He described his last five placements in chronological order, starting
with Mr. and Mrs. B., Mr. G., Mrs. E. S., L-T (a locked residential treatment cen-
ter), and the R. program (the residential treatment center where we visited him). He
seemed to really like the B. family placement the best. He discussed his mother a
little bit, stating he was sad when she did not come to see him. He also said he
wanted to be reunited with her, but understands that she may not be ready to care for
him fully. As for other family members, he also briefly mentioned he had two un-
cles, an Auntie R., and someone named K., but did not elaborate on whether they
had been contacted about taking custodial relationship of him (his case file states his
grandmother once had custody for 2 years approximately). Additionally, he men-
tioned several run-away incidents from foster homes, in which he sought his
mother.
6. For commercial depictions of this character, see http://www.dragonballz.com/ (last vis-
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Artistic expression was George's strong suit. Appreciating his art
was a way for us to establish and build rapport with our client.7 Our stu-
dents learned at that very first interview that a child communicates differ-
ently than an adult, and that even a teenager has different ways of express-
ing himself.8  The Clinic valued the way he expressed himself in his
drawing as much as his words; and during the three years that we were his
attorneys, we learned much about him through his art.9
ited Feb. 16, 2005).
7. Using art or other forms of interaction (e.g., puppets, role play, or other experimental
techniques) to communicate with child clients is, of course, widely practiced by experienced chil-
dren's lawyers and law school clinicians. See, e.g., JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING
CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 125
(1997) (describing the case of one child client in which "[t]he client's love of drawing and his
own expression through embellishing some of the pictures and rejecting others allowed him to
exchange information through a medium that was comfortable ... ").
8. See ANNE GRAFFAM WALKER, HANDBOOK ON QUESTIONING CHILDREN: A LINGUISTIC
PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (2d ed. 1999) (noting that adolescents ages 11-18 are not necessarily good at
narrative skills; do not understand time as both a historical concept and a day-to-day concept; are
confused by linguistic ambiguity; can be confused by long, complex questions; and many teens,
particularly under-educated, under-parented, unattached children, have the communication skills
of younger children).
9. Beyond its use of art as a technique for establishing rapport and building trust with indi-
vidual clients, the Clinic has integrated artistic expression into its law reform and pedagogical
missions. Therapeutic Jurisprudence has informed all of this activity. Our most significant law
reform effort was a multi-year Florida Supreme Court proceeding seeking greater due process
protections for foster children facing commitment to locked psychiatric facilities by the state De-
partment of Children and Families. We relied on the principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to
argue that affording foster children a pre-commitment hearing at which they are represented by
counsel furthers their therapeutic interests and is psychologically beneficial for these children.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed with and adopted this argument in the three decisions that it
rendered on the due process rights of foster children facing involuntary commitment to these fa-
cilities. See M.W. v. Davis & DCF, 756 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2000); see also Amendment to Rules of
Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2001); Amendment to Rules of
Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 842 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2003).
In an effort to study the therapeutic benefits of giving voice to foster children facing invol-
untary civil commitment, the Clinic subsequently established the Voice Project. The project's
goals are to teach law students to apply the principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, to give cli-
ents a voice in legal and policy decisions that affect their lives, and to study the therapeutic bene-
fits of empowering them to speak and be heard in the legal process. Our collaborators are our law
school colleague Bruce Winick, the co-founder of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Xavier Cor-
tada, a lawyer and artist.
Through the Voice Project, the artist and Clinic students worked with children confined in
two residential hospitals to create collaborative murals capturing the children's individual stories
and concerns. The aim was to use art as a therapeutic agent giving voice to foster children in
these facilities and as a vehicle to generate awareness for the community at-large. The children
also worked one-on-one with law students to create individual pieces of self-expression. The first
Voice Project mural, Trapped, created in 2002, depicts the voicelessness and despair of children
locked up in these facilities.
In 2002, the Clinic and Cortada were awarded a grant from the Miami-Dade County De-
partment of Cultural Affairs to produce a second painting portraying the more hopeful aspirations
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Back in the office following this initial interview, my students, Prab-
hath and Ariel, and I waded through volumes of court, hospital, school,
therapy, and other confidential records, and began to construct a narrative
of a childhood in foster care. The harrowing narrative that the two students
prepared for me recited the details of a chaotic and unstable childhood. It
described a single, mentally ill mother unable to care for George, removed
from her custody at the age of two due to allegations that the mother was a
substance abuser, had exposed him to episodes of domestic violence in the
home, refused to reveal the identity and whereabouts of his father, and sub-
jected him to severe neglect and emotional abuse.
After a short and unhappy stay in the home of his Jamaican-American
grandmother, which ended under a cloud of sexual abuse allegations,
George began his long and tortuous journey through foster care, experienc-
ing more than forty different foster care homes and other placements, at
least twenty-five different school placements, ten different psychiatric di-
agnoses, and as many as eight different psychotropic medications pre-
scribed to manage behaviors described in one report as "hyperactive, op-
positional, poor impulse control, depression, separation anxiety."
The records in George's case told the story of a single child adrift in
Florida's foster care system without achieving a permanent home, sepa-
rated for a seeming eternity from his mother, living in institutions at the
margins of the system, desperately lonely, filled with pent-up anger at the
system, and never heard from by the court.'0
of these clients. During the fall 2003 semester, Clinic students, faculty, and the artist traveled to
the Jackson Memorial Hospital Statewide Inpatient Psychiatric Program, a children's psychiatric
facility, where Cortada's mural 2003 Voice Project Mural was created and unveiled. Both the
2003 painting and its 2002 companion piece were on exhibit from March through July 2004 in the
rotunda of the Florida Supreme Court. Xavier Cortada, May it Please the Court: A Solo Exhibit
by Xavier Cortada, at http://www.cortada.com/gallery/virtualexhibits/2004/supreme-court/may-
it-please.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). The two murals, and the children's contributions to
them, appear throughout the Children & Youth Law Clinic website, at http://www.law.miami.edu
/cylc (last visited Feb. 16, 2005). Both works will be permanently displayed at the Law School.
10. To the extent that a lawyer and client begin to "frame the story of the case" at their first
meeting, our first conversation with George may have been a foreshadowing or pre-telling of
many events, while other events that occurred during the next three years were not foreseeable
and thus not part of the narratives told by the client (through the filter of the student's intake
memorandum) or the students (through their summary of court and other records). See, e.g.,
Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (story told by client more effective than lawyer's strategy);
Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law As Language, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2459, 2482-83 (1989) Cunningham states that,
[als the lawyer attempts to 'make a case' out of the client's lay narrative, there is in-
deed a transformation of 'reality,' but only at one level, the level of knowledge. The
lawyer cannot change the client's raw memories of the experience but can indeed must
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Thus a more than three-year relationship with our client George be-
gan." The present article describes the Clinic's work in George's case and
how it exemplified some of the lawyering skills that are traditionally taught
in the clinical legal education setting, particularly in live-client clinics-
client interviewing and counseling, developing inter-personal skills with
clients, fact-finding, motion practice, legal analysis, oral advocacy, and
presentation of evidence-and the kinds of reflection or review that we
used with students to evaluate their clinic performance.' 2 This article sur-
veys some of the problems faced by youth aging out of foster care, ana-
lyzes the federal and state legal framework designed to remedy these prob-
lems, and describes how our Clinic uses the insights of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the methods of preventive law to help clients obtain in-
dependent living and support services before and after their discharge from
state custody at age eighteen.
In recent years, the Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive law
model has begun to penetrate legal education. As this article attempts to
show, this model has much to offer clinical legal education and child advo-
cacy clinics, in particular. This article describes how Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence and the Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law model are used in
the Children & Youth Law Clinic, and demonstrates their value in the con-
text of representing one foster care client of the Clinic. Specific examples
of our activity are rewound to analyze the strategies or techniques the
Clinic used or, in retrospect, should have used, to address or prevent some
alter the client's knowledge of 'what happened' by reconstituting that experience into a
different symbolic form.
Id.
11. See PETERS, supra note 7, at 77 ("As the lawyer enters the child's world, the client must
get to a full-bodied understanding of the lawyer's potential place in her life. The lawyer must
also get to a three-dimensional understanding of the child-in-context.").
12. ABA, Legal Education and Professional Development: An Educational Continuum, Re-
port of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992 A.B.A.
SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMIS. TO THE B. REP. 234-36 (known as the "MacCrate Report")
[hereinafter MacCrate Report].(describing the range of lawyering skills and values that law
school clinical programs should aspire to teach students); Assoc. of Am. Law Schools, Report of
the Committee on the Future of the In-House Legal Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 511, 513 (1992)
Because the student's performance in role is the heart of the clinical experience, many
clinicians recognize as an explicit goal the inculcation of methods by which the student
can learn from experience. By critiquing student performance and by encouraging stu-
dents to engage in self- and peer-critique, clinicians seek to provide their students with
the tools to enable them to engage in analysis of their performance when they are in
practice.
id.; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education: A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 612, 616 (1984) (describing one of the roles of clinical legal education as requiring stu-
dents to "work through the relationships between legal analysis, communication, and interper-
sonal dynamics.").
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of the legal problems that occurred at different junctures in the case." In
particular, the article considers how we sought to identify our client's "psy-
cholegal soft spots,"' 4 how we identified or developed strategies to address
those psycholegal soft spots, how we used preventive law techniques such
as "legal checkups," 5 and how we evaluated the therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic effects of the available strategies.
This article also examines how the attorney-client relationship with
George evolved from that first meeting. Viewing the Clinic's relationship
with George-from the different and sometimes conflicting perspectives of
the client, student, and teacher-lawyer-as he made the uncertain, difficult
and painful transition from foster care to adulthood, 6 this article considers
how the use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive law enriched the
13. ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, PREVENTIVE LAW: MATERIALS ON A NON ADVERSARIAL
LEGAL PROCESS xxxvii-xli (1997) (describing the role of the preventive lawyer in working with
the client to propose the careful private ordering of affairs as a method of avoiding the high costs
of litigation and ensuring desired outcomes and opportunities).
14. See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots
and Strategies, 67 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 317 (1998), reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45, 48 (Dennis P. Stolle, et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE] (describing how certain legal proce-
dures or legal interventions may produce or reduce anxiety, anger, hurt feelings, and other dimen-
sions of law-related psychological well-being in clients); see also Marc W. Patry, et al., Better
Legal Counseling Through Empirical Research: Identifying Psycholegal Soft Spots and Strate-
gies, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 439 (1998), reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,
at 69 (proposing strategies for lawyers and clients to identify and discuss psycholegal soft spots)
[hereinafter Better Legal Counseling].
15. See Dennis P. Stolle, et al., Integrating Preventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
A Law and Psychology Based Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 27 (1997), re-
printed in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at 5, 17 (describing the
legal check-up as a "structured opportunity for the client to reevaluate his or her current life situa-
tion relative to his or her goals, and to think about and plan for the immediate and distant future.")
[hereinafter Integrating Preventive Law]; see also HARDAWAY, supra note 13, at 180-222 (de-
scribing "legal check-ups").
16. As illustrated infra §§ IV and V of this Article, from time to time there were conflicts or
tensions between the views or perspectives of Clinic attorneys and interns and George. See
Nancy Cook, Legal Fictions: Clinical Experiences, Lace Collars and Boundless Stories, I CLIN.
L. REV. 41 (1994) (discussing student and client tensions over "theory" of the case). Discussions
about the Therapeutic Jurisprudence dimensions of issues or problems often helped students to
mediate or understand how to advocate for the client's wishes, even when the student was con-
fused about or opposed to the goals sought by the client. For example, as described infra § IV.B,
toward the end of his 15 years in state custody, just months shy of his 18th birthday, George ex-
pressed an urgent desire to be "emancipated" from foster care. George also insisted that the
Clinic not seek any post-foster care aid from DCF under the Road to Independence Act, even
though this would potentially cut him off from needed subsistence and medical benefits. In both
cases there were significant disagreements with George about his goals and views, which we
could not resolve or reconcile. Viewing these conflicts through the Therapeutic Jurisprudence
lens helped to mediate these conflicts and helped the students consider ways to motivate our cli-
ent to reassess his position.
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students' educational experience in the Clinic, and how, in the end, this ex-
perience had a transformative effect on the client.
7
This article evaluates how teaching and practicing Therapeutic Juris-
prudence in a law school child advocacy clinic can accomplish the goal ar-
ticulated by Therapeutic Jurisprudence scholarship, to "broaden the coun-
seling mission, and... convert the practice of law into a helping and
healing profession in ways that make it a much more humanitarian tool."'8
By in-depth appraisal of the work done by the Clinic in one case for a sin-
gle client, with a focus on the role of the child's Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence/preventive lawyer in doing legal checkups with the child to avoid
psycholegal soft spots, this article is a descriptive case-study, similar to a
medical school grand round, of the practice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and preventive law in a child advocacy clinic, with its many frustrations
and satisfactions for the teacher, clinic student, and client. 9
Lastly, this article gives general recommendations on how law school
child advocacy clinics can teach students to apply the principles of Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence and preventive law in their practice and how the prac-
tice of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the experiential setting of a clinic gives
them opportunities to reflect upon and critique their role as lawyers for
children.2" It also suggests ways of broadening the reach of Therapeutic
17. The last of our student interns in George's case, Chad Shimel, made this insightful ob-
servation about the instructive role that Therapeutic Jurisprudence played in his legal training in
our Clinic:
I found this week's class discussion on Therapeutic Jurisprudence to be particularly
interesting and pertinent to many of the issues we deal with here at the clinic. It is
pretty obvious that there can be great advantages to children and society to allow
them to express themselves in court, tell their story, and to get adequate legal repre-
sentation. At the same time, by allowing the child to feel as though they have a voice,
and are permitted to participate in the proceedings they are involved in, the outcomes
and rulings by the judges can be more easily understood by the child. I definitely feel
that the concept of Therapeutic Jurisprudence has a place in the courtroom. I see
nothing wrong with giving children sanctions that are intended to rehabilitate them,
and to put them in a better position than before they entered the legal system. Chil-
dren are often involved in the legal system due to no fault of their own, and yet it
seems as though they are often treated as criminals simply because they have no fam-
ily to care for them. Any system that intends to help children, rather than simply pun-
ish them, should do nothing but help the child, as well as society as a whole.
Clinic Weekly Journal, June 24, 2004 (on file with author) [hereinafter Clinic Weekly Journal].
18. Integrating Preventive Law, supra note 15, at 5.
19. See generally Gary Bellow & Martha Minow, Introduction: Rita's Case and Other Law
Stories, in LAW STORIES 1 (Gary Bellow and Martha Minow, eds., 1998) (celebrating lawyer
story-telling and narrative that "reflects (a) multiple points of view; (b) textured depictions of
conventional practices and institutional cultures; and (c) insights into how legal workers and
those affected by the law make their choices, understand their actions, and experience the frustra-
tions and satisfactions they entail.").
20. Clinical scholarship is replete with self-critical examinations of strategies and tactics de-
ployed by poverty lawyers, law school clinicians and their students, the ethical role those lawyers
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play in representing their clients, and the use of client narrative to explore the ethical and lawyer-
ing questions encountered in these cases. See, e.g., Jane Spinak, Reflections on a Case (of Moth-
erhood), 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1990 (1995); Marie Ashe, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration
of Progressive Thought and Action: The "Bad Mother" in Law and Literature: A Problem of
Representation, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 1017 (1992); Peter Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judg-
ment and Other Tales of the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical
Legal Education, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (1994); Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law
Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
Similarly, child advocates and children's law scholars have produced scholarship that uses
client narratives to critically examine lawyer-client relationships and lawyer ethics and to elicit
the client's authentic voice. See, e.g., Janet A. Chaplan, Youth Perspectives on Lawyers' Ethics:
A Report on Seven Interviews, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1763, 1765 (1996)
Thus, listening to the details of the clients' concerns is a better tool for understanding
the preferences of powerless clients than are the classical ethical abstractions. Post-
modem scholars characterize this change in emphasis as looking to narrative rather
than normative models to solve ethical questions: the client's story, rather than the
structure of the lawyer's case, is the primary focus.
Id.; Emily Buss, "You're My What? ": The Problem of Children's Misperceptions of Their Law-
yers'Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1699 (1996); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg:
A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1747, 1753 (1993)
Out of respect for children's perspectives, I have chosen a methodology that builds my
argument out of children's and their families' stories. Narrative can suggest not only a
competing normative perspective but a new way of getting there. Stories can be de-
ployed not only as a framework for constructing legal arguments, but as voices claim-
ing unique authenticity and authority, as witnesses for a class of powerless outsiders,
to mediate between the reader's concrete experience and the world of legal abstraction,
and, I hope, to persuade by invoking a common store of experience and empathy.
Children's law scholars have used client narrative to construct a client empowerment model in
which the lawyer rejects normative ethical standards such as client capacity to empower child
clients through the lawyering process. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empow-
erment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64
FORDHAM L. REv. 1655, 1656 (1996) (proposing "a new lawyering model that stems from an
empowerment perspective on the rights of children ... rejects capacity as an organizing principle
in rights theory.., and argues that the powerlessness of children mandates their empowerment").
Only recently has Therapeutic Jurisprudence scholarship begun to critically study the prac-
tical application of its theoretical assumptions and to use client narrative as a vehicle for this
process of empirical study and self-reflection. See, e.g., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14; Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive
Law's Transformative Potential for Particular Areas of Legal Practice: Family Law: Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law in Child Welfare Proceedings: A Family Systems Ap-
proach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 951 (1999) (describing application of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence to child welfare representation); Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and
Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89
(2002) (describing the role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in juvenile justice proceedings); Pearl
Goldman & Leslie Larkin Cooney, Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventative Law and Law Teach-
ing: Beyond Core Skills and Values: Integrating Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Preventive Law
Into the Law School Curriculum, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1123, 1136-1145 (1999) (describ-
ing the use of case examples to teach principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive law
in lawyering skills simulation courses); Keri K. Gould & Michael L Perlin, Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence: Issues, Analysis, and Applications: "Johnny s in the Basement/Mixing up His Medicine ":
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Clinical Teaching, 24 SEAT7LE UNIV. L. R. 339, 359-71 (2000)
(describing the use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in clinical programs that represent persons with
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Jurisprudence into both clinical legal education and child advocacy.
II. THE FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAM:
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. FROM FOSTER CARE TO ADULTHOOD THROUGH THE CHAFEE FOSTER
CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAM
The federal government has funded transitional services for youth in
foster care for nearly two decades in recognition of the challenges faced by
foster youth as they confront the complexities of adult responsibilities de-
spite little preparation. Congress first enacted the Federal Independent Liv-
ing Program in 1986 to assist foster youth transitioning to life independent
from the child welfare system.2' In 1999 Congress amended the federal
program through the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, resulting in
the creation of the John H. Chafee Foster Care Independence Program.
The Chafee Program significantly increased federal funding for tran-
sitional services for foster youth from $70 million to $140 million annually
and expanded the types of services and age eligibility criteria for participat-
ing foster youth.2 ' The purpose of the Chafee Program is "to provide fi-
nancial, housing, counseling, employment, education, and other appropriate
support and services to former foster care recipients between 18 and 21
years of age to complement their own efforts to achieve self-
sufficiency ....24 The increase in funding and expansion of services dem-
onstrates Congress's unambiguous message that former foster youth need
significant support, guidance and outside resources in order to have a fight-
disabilities). The present article is an attempt to weave together these clinical and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence scholarship strands.
21. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 294 (1986) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1986)). See Raudi
P. Guinn, Passage of the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999: A Pivotal Step on Behalf of
Youth Aging Out of Foster Care and Into a Life of Poverty, 7 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 403
(2000) (describing the increased funding and greater flexibility given to states by the Chafee Pro-
gram to help young people make the transition from foster care to self-sufficiency); Jill K. Jensen,
Note, Fostering Interdependence: A Family-Centered Approach to Help Youth Aging Out of Fos-
ter Care, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvOC. 329, 332-37 (2004) (describing federal legisla-
tion relating to adolescents in foster care, with emphasis on the Foster Care Independence Act of
1999 and its relationship to the concept of permanency planning); Michelle Benedetto, An Ounce
of Prevention: A Foster Youth's Substantive Due Process Right to Proper Preparation for Eman-
cipation, 9 U.C. Davis J. L. & Pol'y 381 (2005)..
22. John H. Chafee Foster Care Independence Program, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822
(1999) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 677 (2003)).
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 677(a)(5) (2003).
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fighting chance at a successful adulthood. 5
In findings associated with the creation of the Chafee Program, Con-
gress estimated that "about 20,000 adolescents leave the Nation's foster
care system each year because they have reached 18 years of age and are
expected to support themselves. 26 However, the dim reality for many of
these youth was that they were not becoming instantly independent upon
turning eighteen. The Chafee Program resulted from testimony showing
that within two to four years of leaving foster care, only one-half of young
adults complete high school; fewer than half are employed; one-fourth have
been homeless at least one night; thirty percent lack access to medical care;
sixty percent of women give birth; and less than one-fifth are completely
self sufficient. 27 According to Commissioner Williams:
Each year nearly 20,000 young people in foster care reach the age of
18 and must enter adulthood without the financial or emotional support
of a family. As any of us who have raised teenagers can attest, it is a
rare young person who is ready on his or her 18t birthday to be fully
autonomous and economically self-sufficient. We do not expect this of
our own children. And yet, this is the burden we currently place on
young adults aging out of the foster care system.28
25. In the House debate on the bill, Florida Congressman Mark Foley pointed out that in
1998,
Florida had 3,103 youths who were eligible for independent living programs. Al-
though some of these kids have foster parents who stick with them and are willing to
help, including giving them money out of their own pockets, many have been shuffled
around so much that they do not have anyone to turn to. These foster children have
barely been able to be kids, and suddenly they are forced to become instant adults. It
is no wonder that many of them end up on the streets or on welfare, or as teenaged
parents.
145 CONG. REc. H4961-62 (daily ed. June 25, 1999). The Chafee Program had an immediate and
calculable impact on Florida's Independent Living budget for older foster youth, increasing the
budget allocation from $900,000 to over $6.1 million. See Shana Gruskin, State to Help Foster
Kids Master Adult Life Program Gains Funds to Give Teens Cushion and Teach Skills They ll
Need For Making Decisions, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), Jan. 2, 2000, at lB.
26. H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. § 101(a)(3) (1999).
27. Challenges Confronting Older Children Leaving Foster Care: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 106-26
(1999) (statement of Carol W. Williams, Assoc. Comm'r, Children's Bureau, Admin. for Chil-
dren, Youth and Families) [hereinafter Hearings on Challenges Confronting Children].
28. Id. Commissioner Williams' testimony was bolstered by numerous studies examined by
the GAO and reported in the literature. These studies identified 27% of males and 10% of fe-
males as having been incarcerated at least once in the 12 to 18 months following foster care. See
Susan V. Mangold, Symposium, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right to Protection
for Older Foster Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
835, 862-68 (2000).
Numerous reports on various nationwide studies of foster care outcomes have noted that
20% to 40% of our county's homeless population consists of former foster youth. See, e.g., J. C.
Harden, After Release From Foster Care, Many Turn to Lives on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
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These sobering statistics are all the more profound when considered
in light of the fact that states had already been receiving federal funding to
assist foster youth with transitional services. Clearly, the programs as ad-
ministered by the states leading up to the passage of the federal legislation
were not enabling older foster youth to achieve independence as adults and
were in need of reform.
By enacting the Chafee Program, Congress intended to rectify sub-
stantive deficiencies in the delivery of services and the lack of accountabil-
ity of state independent living programs. In its November 1999 report to
Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported its findings
culled from the 1998 annual reports received from forty-five of the fifty
states. The GAO noted that of those states submitting reports, only twenty-
six offered tutoring to help youth graduate from high school or receive a
GED, only twenty-eight states assisted with job readiness, only 18 states
provided guidance with job placement, and although a majority of the
states provided transitional housing arrangements to foster youth in state
1991, at Al; Jill Leovy, Harsh Rites of Passage: Youth: Residents of the Independent Living
Program Apartments Come from Foster Care and the Juvenile Justice System. Now They Must
Find Their Place in Society With None of the Resources Most of Us Take for Granted, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at B1; Maia Davis, Fostering Independence in Wards of the
State: Services: Program Teaches Youths Skills They Will Need When Their Aid is Cut Off at 18.
Being Alone Adds to the Challenges, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at B1; Bella English,
Aging Out: The State is Not Required to Care for Foster Children Beyond Their 18th Birthday.
But That's Precisely When Many Young People Need A Helping Hand Into Adulthood, BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 16, 1994, at 11; Evette Soto-Maldonado, To Be 18 Years Old and Homeless, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at A23; Robert A. Frahm, Living by Himself, A City Teenager Overcomes
Odds, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 23, 1996, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, At 18, It's Sink or
Swim: For Ex-Foster Children, Transition is Difficult, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 1998, at
AO1; David Holmstrom, The Unadoptables; What Happens to Tens of Thousands of Teens Who
'Age Out' of Foster Care Each Year?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 4., 1998, at BI;
Mary Beth Murphy, Children Struggle When Set Free of Foster Care, Study Says, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Dec. 7, 1998, at 1; Marijke Rowland, Free and Alone: Ready or Not, Foster
Youth Out of the System at Age 18, THE MODESTO BEE (CA), Apr. 18, 1999, at Al; Ruth Mass-
inga, Aging Out of Foster Care: Before pushing Kids out of the System, Help Them be Independ-
ent, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 22, 1999, at 11.
Further, a Wisconsin study of former foster youth found that "by 12-18 months past dis-
charge, 37 percent of the young adults had not yet completed high school ... [and that only] nine
percent had entered college." MARK E. COURTNEY & IRVING PILIAVIN, FOSTER YOUTH
TRANSITIONS TO ADULTHOOD: OUTCOMES 12 TO 18 MONTHS AFTER LEAVING OUT-OF-HOME
CARE 2 (July 1998) (revised August 1998) (on file with author). Other studies have shown that
former foster youth face unemployment at rates anywhere from 25% up to 51%. Foster Care
Independent Living: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Human Resources of the House Comm.
on the Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 22 (1999) (statement of Cynthia Fagnoni) [hereinafter Fos-
ter Care Independent Living]. Finally, approximately 40% percent of the former foster youth in
the Wisconsin study had trouble obtaining medical care most or all of the time even though nearly
half of those youth had received mental health services while in care. Id. (statement of Mark
Courtney).
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care, only a third of the states offered housing to youth after leaving the
foster care system.29
In making these changes, Congress recognized not only that many
states were falling short in assisting older youth in preparation for adult-
hood, but also, more importantly, that 18-year-old foster youths were just
not ready for the overwhelming responsibilities of adulthood without addi-
tional guidance, preparation, and time. As Congressman Mark Foley testi-
fied: "Fortunately for most of us we had loving and supportive... [sic] of
family and parents to nurture, encourage, and teach us how to gradually en-
ter adulthood. I could never imagine the feelings of fear or uncertainty that
a foster care [youth] approaching his or her 18th birthday must have. 30
B. VIEW FROM FLORIDA: ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE OR ROAD TO
HOMELESSNESS?
Florida lawmakers, like their counterparts in Congress, have for years
acknowledged that "[t]he traditional foster care system often fails to meet
the needs of children in the legal custody of the department.' In 1994, the
legislature found that the special needs of older foster care children were
not being met by Department of Children and Families:
The foster care system includes a larger pool of older children who
have more complicated problems and who have been in care for long
periods of time and are not faring well in care. Alternate care place-
ments for adolescents are often inadequate or inappropriate, and ser-
vices are inadequate to prepare them for independent living .... Ado-
lescents are often inappropriately and repeatedly placed in the foster
care system, typically spend long periods in alternate care, lack a stable
environment, and exhibit behavior problems such as truancy, delin-
quency, and physical or sexual abuse.32
29. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 106TH CONG., REPORT ON FOSTER CARE:
EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT LIVING SERVICES UNKNOWN 7, 11 (1999). In response to
some of these shortfalls, the Chafee legislation now permits states to expend up to 30% of their
federal funds for room or board for youth 18 to 21 years of age, to extend services in general to
youth ages 18 to 21 who have left foster care and to extend at state option Medicaid benefits for
youths ages 18 to 21. See 42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2002); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII) (2004).
30. 145 CONG. REC. H4962 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement of Rep. Mark Foley).
31. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(1)(a)(1) (2004). See also Bernard Perlmutter, Carolyn Salisbury
& Michael Stanger, Preparing for Life After Foster Care: Florida's Independent Living Program
for Foster Care Teens, 9 FLA. B. PUB. INT. L. SEC. REP. 4, 4-5 (2000) (describing policies and
practices in the Florida Independent Living program prior to the 2002 enactment of the Road to
Independence Act).
32. FLA. STAT. § 409.1673(l)(a)(3)-(4), (1)(b) (2003). See also 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-164.
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In enacting the Road to Independence Act,33 the Florida analog to the
Chafee law, the Florida legislature in 2002 relied on prior findings and on
more recent reports and studies documenting the serious unmet needs of
older foster youth in this state and nationally.34 The Senate bill analysis
quoted a key finding of a Casey Foundation report, Shortening Children's
Stays in Temporary Care, confirming that these "youth face extremely lim-
ited futures: many perform below average academically, rely on public as-
sistance and end up on the streets."35 The House bill incorporated into its
analysis the 1999 GAO study finding systemic deficiencies in the delivery
of employment training, skills training and supervised practice-living op-
portunities to enable foster youths to "become proficient at living self-
sufficiently. '36
Thus, the Florida legislature has long been aware of the grave prob-
lems facing these youth and the systemic deficiencies in serving their needs
for housing, health care, independent living skills training, and post-
secondary education.37 Despite (or perhaps because of) the Road to Inde-
33. 2002 Fla. Laws ch. 19 (creating FLA. STAT. § 409.1451 (2003)).
34. See generally SHIRK & STANGLER, supra note 1, at 84-86 (evaluating Florida's perform-
ance in providing independent living services leading up to the Road to Independence Act, noting
that the 1999 GAO study found evidence of improved outcomes for young people who received
independent living services, and pointing out that "in 2002, more than half of Florida teens in fos-
ter care were receiving no training in independent living skills before being discharged" from
care).
The Florida legislature is not the only governmental branch to acknowledge the dire cir-
cumstances facing Florida's foster children at age 18. See, e.g., L.Y. & Melody v. Dep't of
Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 696 So. 2d 430, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) The Melody
opinion included a special concurrence by Judge Pariente stating:
With these budgetary cuts in mind, are the children over eighteen, regardless of how
well they may or may not be doing, the next targets? This Court fears that they are,
and that a large number of children are going to be cut loose with no resources other
than to resort to public assistance, crime, prostitution, and other degrading acts in order
to survive. Did the people who may be cutting them loose adequately fulfill their re-
sponsibility to prepare these people for independence?
Id.; see also Occean v. Kearney 123 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that a former foster
care beneficiary stated procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against state officials by alleging that he had a property interest in continued foster care as pro-
vided by state statute, that he was entitled to benefits until age of 21, that officials provided him with
plan calling for him to remain in foster care, and that officials violated juvenile court's prohibition on
terminating his foster placement without court order).
35. FAMILY TO FAMILY, Tools for Rebuilding Foster Care: Shortening Children's Stays,
available at http://www.aecf.org/initiatives/familytofamily/tools/policiessummary.pdf.
36. Fla. H. R. Comm. on Child and Family Security, Staff Analysis, H.B. 245 (2001).
37. In 2000, the Florida legislature amended FLA. STAT. § 409.145 1(3)(a), extending eligibil-
ity for foster care status and services for young adults through age of 23, to enable them to com-
plete their post-secondary education. See 2000 Fla. Laws ch. 13. This legislative recognition of
the need to provide continuing educational and financial support for older Florida foster care
youth is further demonstration of the need for continuing help from DCF in preparing these youth
ST. THOMASLAWREVIEW
pendence Act, the prospects of youths such as George worsened after 2002.
The most significant change heralded by the new legislation was its elimi-
nation of a provision in Florida law that had previously allowed youth en-
rolled in secondary and post-secondary school to remain in state care
through the age of twenty-three.38
The new law replaced the previous state entitlement of extended fos-
ter care with a patchwork of cash monthly subsidies-or "scholarships"--
for youth enrolled in school, along with aftercare and transitional benefits,
all of which are allotted on a "funds available" basis. 9 Virtually from the
day it was signed into law by Governor Jeb Bush, the Road to Independ-
ence Act was criticized by advocates, editorial writers, and the youth them-
selves for eliminating the safety net of extended foster care, and for impos-
ing onerous eligibility requirements, which led many to re-name the law
the "Road to Homelessness Act."4
Responding to these widespread criticisms of the Road to Independ-
ence Act, the Florida legislature passed a modest amendment to the law in
2004.41 The amendment strengthened the authority of the juvenile court to
oversee the services provided to children by DCF before the termination of
for independence.
38. See, e.g., Carol Marbin Miller, Law Hurts Older Foster Kids, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20,
2003, at 3B; Carol Marbin Miller, Catch-22: Failing Foster Kids Now Will Lose State Aid at 18,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 30, 2003, at 5B; Editorial, Help Older Foster Children: New Law Dumps
18-Year-Olds Not in School, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 31, 2003, at 6B.
39, See FLA. STAT. § 409.1451(5)(b)(5)(c) (2004).
40. See, e.g., Carol Marbin Miller, Advocates: Law Hurts Older Foster Kids: Most Assis-
tance is Eliminated Unless 18-Year-Olds are in College, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 20, 2003, at B3;
Tony Bridges, Many Kids Find DCF Fails Them, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Feb. 7, 2003, at
Al; Susan Gruskin & Megan O'Matz, State to 18-Year-Olds: You're On Your Own; Advocates
Worry About What Will Happen to Teens Who Are No Longer Eligible for DCF Foster Care,
SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), June 4, 2003, at IA; Megan O'Matz, A Tough Road to
Independence; Advocates Say the State Does Too Little for Foster Kids Who Reach Age 18, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), June 25, 2003, at 113; Sara Olkon, CutoffDate Approaches for
Foster Kids Not in School, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2003, at B9; Editorial, Foster Teens' Lonely
Road, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 2003, at 16A; Editorial, Bleak Future for Young Adults,
SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), July 7, 2003, at 20A; Megan O'Matz, All Alone, Too
Soon: Some Florida Legislators Are Trying to Alter the Law That Ends Foster Care at Age 18.
Marcel Taylor's Case Shows Why, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), July 11, 2003, at IA;
Megan O'Matz & Shana Gruskin, Reality Checks: Late Stipends Threaten Former Foster Chil-
dren With Financial Crisis, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), Aug. 2, 2003, at IA; Carol
Marbin Miller, State Gets 10 Days to Prep Teen for Adulthood; The DCF Has Defied Orders to
Teach a Foster Child to Live on Her Own. The Girl-Soon to be 18-And Her Child May End
Up Homeless, Her Lawyer Says, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 10, 2003, at B3; Editorial, No Home, No
Money, No Help, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at 8A; ASSOCIATED PRESS, Disabled
Woman Sues Over DCF Education Plan; Lawsuit Alleges Discrimination, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 28, 2004, at B6 [hereinafter Disabled Woman Sues Over DCF Education Plan].
41. See generally 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 362, § 1.
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court jurisdiction at age eighteen, and removed barriers to participation in
the Road to Independence scholarship program by students with educa-
tional disabilities past age eighteen.42 The input and advocacy of the
Clinic's clients was invaluable in this law reform effort as it gave them op-
portunities to tell their powerful stories to the legislature and to share their
experiences with the public.43
42. These amendments to the Road to Independence Act, which were drafted and advocated
by the Children & Youth Law Clinic with the assistance of our clients (a collaboration that in it-
self evidences a Therapeutic Jurisprudence approach to systems reform advocacy), remedied at
least some of the deficiencies advocates (and the youths themselves) believe have existed in the
law since its inception. Among other changes, Florida Statute § 39.701(7)(a)(10) (2004), now
requires that DCF file a report on the status of independent living services provided to any foster
child 13 or older. The new § 39.701(6) assures that there will be a review hearing for any foster
child within 90 days after his or her 17th birthday, and outlines what the court is entitled to expect
from DCF in determining whether the independent living services needed by the child have been
provided. Notably, in the event the court determines that DCF has not met its obligations, the
court is statutorily authorized to issue a rule to show cause allowing DCF 30 days to comply or
risk contempt. FLA. STAT. § 39.701(8)(c) (2004). Section 409.1451 explicitly requires that older
children in foster care and young adults who exit foster care are to receive life skills activities and
educational opportunities to better prepare them for self-sufficiency as adults. FLA. STAT. §
409.1451 (1)(b) (2004).
The new legislation also eliminates the requirement under § 409.1451 that a Road to Inde-
pendence scholarship recipient be required to maintain a 2.0 grade point average or be capable of
receiving a high school diploma within two years. FLA. STAT. § 409.1451(5)(b) (2004). Thus,
for example, youths who spend their childhoods in state care, and who are educationally disabled,
now qualify for the financial benefits of the scholarship program (and consequently, continuing
Medicaid coverage) while attending an exceptional student education program irrespective of
grade point average or ability to complete high school within two years of exiting state care.
The catalyst for the latter amendment was a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit filed in federal dis-
trict court by the Clinic challenging the law's failure to provide reasonable accommodation to
educationally disabled youth seeking Road to Independence scholarships, in violation of Title 11
of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12201, et seq. See Disabled Woman Sues
Over DCF Education Plan, supra note 40; Megan O'Matz, Teen Sues DCFfor Discrimination;
18-Year-Old Fights to Stay in Class, Keep School Stipend, SUN-SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE,
FL), Jan. 27, 2004, at lB.
While the 2004 amendments to the Road to Independence Act brought about some positive
reforms, under the guise of conserving limited funds, Florida Statute § 409.1451 (5)(b)(4) (2004)
requires DCF to perform a funding needs assessment to determine the extent of the youth's "liv-
ing and educational needs." Id. This requirement is already causing anxiety and hardship to a
number of scholarship recipients, some of whom have learned that their Road to Independence
scholarships will be reduced from $892 per month to the minimum allotment of $25, in many
cases due to erroneous calculations of need by the Department. See, e.g., Megan O'Matz, The
Well Runs Dry; State Assessment Formula to Slice Into Aid Ex-Foster Children Receive, SUN-
SENTINEL (FT. LAUDERDALE, FL), Nov. 8, 2004, at lB.
43. This client/community-driven legislative advocacy strategy was modeled on one pio-
neered by the California Youth Connection, whose website describes its mission and accom-
plishments, in part, as follows:
California Youth Connection is an advocacy/youth leadership organization for current
and former foster youth. We are young people, who because of our experiences with
the child welfare system, now work to improve foster care, to educate the public and
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C. ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE ADVOCACY AND
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
Even though there have been modest, incremental improvements to
the Road to Independence Act, which make it easier for youth to qualify for
more services after they leave the foster care system, the challenge for chil-
dren's advocates is how to make these services palatable to youth who have
grown up in state care and become so embittered and distrustful of DCF
that they rebuff offers of assistance from DCF as soon as they are able to
leave the system." What can Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive
law teach us about ways to engender trust and confidence in these embit-
tered adolescent clients toward the system that has marginalized and si-
lenced them?45
policy makers about our unique needs and to change the negative stereotypes many
people have of us.
There are now 22 active chapters of CYC in California with over 250 members, ages
14 to 24. CYC is a youth-run organization that provides invaluable opportunities to
learn leadership skills. CYC youth put on two statewide conferences per year to dis-
cuss state level legislative and local issues we want to work on; we also organize a Day
at the Capitol to educate legislators about foster care issues.
WHY CYC IS IMPORTANT:
CYC gives us a voice to speak about foster care. No one can be clearer or more ar-
ticulate about how the foster care system has worked for-or against-us. When we
tell our stories, people listen.
at http://www.calyouthconn.org/fact.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (emphasis added).
44. Perhaps one reason our client did not listen to, or was turned off by, our entreaties to ac-
cept government assistance post-emancipation from foster care, as described infra in Part IV.D,
was the way we presented his legal options and the non-legal consequences of choosing to forgo
state benefits. See generally Austin Sarat & William L. F. Felstiner, Symposium, Lawyers and
Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663, 1670-81,
1688 (1989) (criticizing the way lawyers talk to their clients about the legal system, and finding
that people who use legal processes tend, no matter how favorable the results of their encounter,
to have a less positive view of the law than those with no direct experience). See also discussion
infra Part V.
45. See generally FESTINGER, supra note 2, at 273.
Children who are in foster care want to be treated like others. But there is a difference.
They are foster children and feel different because of that. "Foster' [sic] sounds like a
disease,' said one, whereas others spoke of a positive experience as one in which the
word 'foster' was not used. 'We wanted to feel part of the society and so we didn't let
on we were in foster care.' This was not an isolated incident, for nearly 58% of the re-
spondents said that it was very or pretty true that at times they did not want to ac-
knowledge being a foster child. Furthermore, close to 63% felt that children in foster
care feel different or set apart from other young people.
Id.; see also Jill Chaifetz, Listening to Foster Children in Accordance With the Law: The.Failure
to Serve Children in State Care, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 10 (1999)
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As one leading study of the views and attitudes of youth discharged
from the foster care system found, being excluded from the decision-
making process was one of the most common criticisms youth leveled
against the system:
The remarks and suggestions made by foster care graduates contained
a recurrent theme-the importance of consultation with the young
people themselves. They felt like pawns-subject to the many powers
of others. They felt disregarded, that it did not matter what they
wanted or had to say, because too often they were never asked.
Whether it was a decision about a foster home, about changes in
placement, about visiting arrangements with kin, or about their goals in
life, they felt they should have been heard.46
Therapeutic Jurisprudence gives children's lawyers a theoretical road
map and interdisciplinary bearings as they navigate the counseling and ad-
vocacy process with their clients. As a field of inquiry that examines the
therapeutic and anti-therapeutic effects of substantive laws, legal proce-
dures, and legal roles, it also gives children's lawyers tools from the behav-
ioral science research that help to promote the public policy aims of the
federal law. For example, the Chafee Act requires states to facilitate con-
nections between foster children and adult mentors, and requires states to
promote youth participation and engagement in case planning. Children's
lawyers should advocate that states follow these requirements of federal
law, which the research demonstrates can promote the psychological and
physical well-being of youth, a central goal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence.47
It is true that more and more children are coming into the system each year, and there
is not enough funding to serve them properly. However, I would suggest there is an-
other failure, so blinding in its simplicity, so fundamental to the success of any service
initiative, that it amazes me that I rarely see it mentioned in the literature of child wel-
fare experts. What is missing is the voice of the children themselves. Children are al-
most always treated as passive objects by the system. The child is rarely, even when
the law requires it, given any choice or explanation about what happens to her or him.
More than one third of children in foster care are ten or older, and could have signifi-
cant votes both in their permanency goals as well as their day-to-day lives in foster
care. The fundamental lack or care and respect shown these children is a major reason
so many of them will never reach their full potential as contributing members of our
society. Consideration of their lack of access to decision-making about their own lives
must be added to the discussion of the failures of the foster care system and how it can
be improved.
Id.
46. FESTINGER, supra note 2, at 296.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(H), (c)(4); see also SHIRK & STANGLER, supra note 1, at 263
(noting that the Chafee Act requires states to certify that they have instituted programs designed
to promote connections between foster care youth and mentors or other "dedicated" adults and
require youth participation and engagement in case planning and that states are obligated to create
programs and services that implement these promises that they have made to the federal govern-
578 ST. THOMASLA WREVIEW [Vol. 17
Moreover, the legislation's policy goal of promoting youth participation
dovetails with a central law reform goal of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the
context of representing older children in foster care: to give voice to and
empower these children by consulting them and involving them in deci-
sions that are important to them, processes that can have therapeutically
beneficial consequences for them."
III. THE THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
PREVENTIVE LAW AGENDAS
In recent years the Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law model
of lawyering has emerged as a significant theoretical model with applica-
tions to a variety of areas of legal practice.49 This model contemplates law-
yers practicing with an "ethic of care' 5° and heightened interpersonal skills,
who seek to prevent and solve legal difficulties for their clients through
sensitive counseling, advance planning, creative problem solving, careful
drafting, and the use of alternative dispute resolution techniques.
A. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE
As conceived by Professors David B. Wexler and Bruce J. Winick
and their collaborators, Therapeutic Jurisprudence is a field of interdisci-
plinary research with a law reform agenda that focuses attention on the
ment as a condition for the receipt of Chafee funding); see also FLA. DEP'T OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES, Chafee Foster Care Independence Program 2005-2009 Application and 2004 Pro-
gress Report, at 11-3 (2004) (describing current DCF programs, improvement strategies under-
way as of April 2004, and future program initiatives with regard to providing "personal and emo-
tional support to children aging out of foster care through mentors and the promotion of
interactions with dedicated adults" and engaging youth in case planning, specifically in individual
education plans, although not in permanency or independent living case plans).
48. Federle, supra note 20, at 1696.
Of course, this may mean that some decisions will be made by the child that the lawyer
believes are wrong or ill-conceived, but then, all clients, not just those of a certain age,
are capable of making and have made bad choices. Nevertheless there is value in al-
lowing a client to speak in her own voice and to determine her own goals. This is the
essence of empowerment and ethical lawyering.
49. See, e.g., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14; Therapeutic Juris-
prudence and Preventive Law: Transforming Legal Practice and Education, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 795, 795-99 (1999); David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Putting Therapeutic Juris-
prudence to Work: The Term May Sound Academic, but it Embodies a Hands-on Approach to
Solving Problems Rather Than Simply Winning Cases, 89 A.B.A. J. 54, 54-57 (2003); see also
JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (Bruce J.
Winick & David B. Wexler eds., 2003) [hereinafter JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY] (applying
approach to judging).
50. See Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empirical Research on Attorney
Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1337, 140t-03 (1997).
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consequences of law for the psychological functioning and emotional well-
being of clients and other persons affected by the legal system.5" Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence uses the tools of the behavioral sciences, and sees the law
and the way in which it is applied by various legal actors, including judges,
attorneys, social workers, and guardians ad litem, as having inevitable con-
sequences for the psychological well-being of clients. As Bruce Winick
has written, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
suggests that these consequences should be taken into account in re-
forming law, when consistent with other important normative values,
to make the law less anti-therapeutic and more therapeutic. It is a
mental health approach to law, suggesting the need for the legal system
to be sensitive to the law's impact on the psychological health of cli-
ents and others involved in the legal system, and for judges, lawyers
and other actors in the legal system to perform their roles with an
awareness of basic principles of psychology. 2
The Children & Youth Law Clinic has used this approach in its ad-
vocacy for individual clients and it has incorporated it broadly into its edu-
cational mission. We have woven classroom and clinic discussions of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence scholarship into our teaching of the elements of
juvenile law and practice. We have used Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
51. See, e.g., BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1997); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, eds., 1996).
52. Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining
and Sentencing: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventive Law Model, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 1034, 1039 (1999), reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at
251-52 [hereinafter Redefining the Role]. The increasingly prominent role of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence in legal education is, in many respects, evidence of the expanding curricular attention to
the teaching of interpersonal and relationship skills in students' law school training. See, e.g.,
Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the Im-
portance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1225 (2004).
53. See, e.g., Bernard P. Perlmutter & Carolyn S. Salisbury, "Please Let Me Be Heard": The
Right of a Florida Foster Child to Due Process Prior to Being Committed to a Long-Term,
Locked Psychiatric Institution, 25 NOVA L. REV. 725 (2001) (proposing application of principles
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to civil commitment hearings for foster children); Bruce J. Winick
& Ginger Lerner Wren, Do Juveniles Facing Civil Commitment Have a Right to Counsel?: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Brief 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 115 (2002); Ronner, supra note 20; Brooks, su-
pra note 20 (proposing application of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and family systems research to
child welfare proceedings); Jensen, supra note 21, at 342-61 (proposing application of Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence and family systems theories to federal independent living legislation); Jan C.
Costello, Why Have Hearings for Kids if You're Not Going to Listen?: A Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Approach to Mental Disability Proceedings for Minors, 71 U. CN. L. REV. 19 (2002) (ex-
ploring the Therapeutic Jurisprudence implications of civil commitment or other mental disability
proceedings involving children); Janet Gilbert, Richard Grimm & John Parnham, Applying Thera-
peutic Principles to a Family-Focused Juvenile Justice Model (Delinquency), 52 ALA. L. REV. 1153
(2001) (applying principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to delinquency court adjudications); David
R. Kater, Confidentiality and Juvenile Mental Health Records in Dependency Proceedings, 12 WM.
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preventive law techniques to teach basic lawyering skills such as client in-
terviewing and counseling, and to aid in understanding the dynamics of
lawyer-client interpersonal relations. 4 We have applied the principles of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence to enforce and expand rights for foster children
in juvenile and family court proceedings," particularly in the context of
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 511, 574 n.322 (2004) (applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence analysis to
safeguarding children's psychotherapist-patient privilege in mental health records); see also A. J.
Stephani, Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Children: Introduction, 71 U. CIN. L.
REv. 13, 15 n.8 (citing to several articles evidencing "an impressive body of scholarship examin-
ing Therapeutic Jurisprudence and how the law affects our children.").
54. With our University of Miami School of Law colleague, Bruce Winick, Clinic faculty co-
teach New Directions in Lawyering: Interviewing, Counseling, and Attorney-Client Relational
Skills, a three-credit practice skills course that introduces students to Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and allied new approaches to the lawyering process. As described in the course description, and
discussed more fully in Bruce Winick's contribution to this symposium, New Directions in
Lawyering explores new approaches to the lawyering role that use non-adversarial, psychologi-
cally beneficial, and humanistic ways to solve legal problems, resolve legal disputes, and prevent
legal difficulties, and the skills they bring to the lawyering process. Students are introduced to
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, preventive law, restorative justice, collaborative law, holistic law,
creative problem solving, and a variety of newly emerging problem solving courts. Particular
emphasis is placed upon exploration of ethical issues in the newly defined role. See Bruce J.
Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: Meeting the Challenge
of the New ABA Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 429 (2005).
The class challenges students to develop ways of bringing increased personal satisfaction,
professionalism, and lawyer well-being to law practice, and increasing creative problem solving,
preventive lawyering, interpersonal relations, interviewing, counseling, and negotiation skills.
Students participate in simulated interviewing and counseling exercises and write short papers
exploring application of one or more of these new approaches to dealing with a particular legal
problem or problems. They also prepare rewind, psycholegal soft-spot and other written exer-
cises. Id.
New Directions in Lawyering culminates with supervised and graded live-client interviews
by students of juveniles awaiting placement in commitment programs at the Miami-Dade County
Juvenile Detention Center. The students use Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law counsel-
ing techniques to help each client to prepare a "relapse prevention" plan designed to help the cli-
ent avoid future problems in their commitment programs and in the juvenile justice system. Id.
See also David B. Wexler, Relapse Prevention Planning Principles for Criminal Law Practice, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1028 (1999) (describing relapse prevention planning by criminal de-
fense lawyers with prisoners as a way of helping them gain insight into how their cognitive and
behavioral processes have contributed to criminality, follow the revised reasoning process in
prison, and use the relapse plan as a basis for parole and eventual reintegration into the commu-
nity).
55. See supra note 42 (describing lawyer collaborations with and organizing of clients to
achieve legislative reform of Florida's Road to Independence Act as a means of helping a client
community achieve collective ends). Our Clinic's collaborations with clients in this group repre-
sentation/law reform effort were not only applications of the Therapeutic Jurisprudence theory of
voice and validation, but also of the "rebellious" community lawyering principles espoused by
Gerald L6pez that view alliance building between social justice lawyers and clients as a key part
of the law reform advocacy enterprise. See, e.g., GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING:
ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992) (proposing a "rebellious
lawyering" model of community and social justice practice, contrasted with traditional "regnant
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children facing involuntary commitment to mental health facilities.56
Our Clinic's efforts to infuse Therapeutic Jurisprudence into the many
facets of our case advocacy and into our skills and doctrinal teaching, oc-
curs as courts in Florida and in other jurisdictions" have recognized the
perspective of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in family and juvenile court pro-
ceedings, in problem solving courts, and in civil and criminal court pro-
ceedings.58 This convergence makes it particularly opportune and appro-
lawyering" models of public interest law practice which subordinate clients and communities);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Practicing Community, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1747 (1994) (reviewing LOPEZ,
supra note 55); Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV.
1103 (1992) (noting that group representation curtails the public interest lawyer's fidelity to the
individual client, but enhances the lawyer's ability to help clients achieve their collective ends).
56. See, e.g., M.W., 756 So. 2d 90, 108-09 (using a Therapeutic Jurisprudence perspective to
suggest that the juvenile court should afford a foster child facing commitment to a locked mental
health facility a "meaningful right to be heard," including a pre-commitment hearing at which the
child is represented by a guardian ad litem and legal counsel); Amendment to Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 804 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. 2001) (proposing a rule of juvenile proce-
dure requiring hearings and counsel for children objecting to placement in residential treatment
centers on Therapeutic Jurisprudence principles); Amendment to Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 842 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2003) (adopting rule of juvenile procedure requiring
counsel and hearings for children objecting to placement in residential treatment centers); S.C. v.
Guardian Ad Litem, 845 So. 2d 953 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (utilizing Therapeutic Jurisprudence
analysis posited in Children & Youth Law Clinic's amicus curiae brief to uphold a foster child's right
to invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege to prevent her court-appointed guardian ad litem from
gaining access to records covered by the privilege).
57. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (adopting a proto-Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
research-based conception of the value of providing juveniles due process safeguards in the con-
text of delinquency adjudications, noting that "recent studies... suggest that the appearance as
well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due proc-
ess-may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is con-
cerned."); In the Matter of the Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001) (applying prin-
ciples of Therapeutic Jurisprudence to civil commitment hearings); see also JUDGING IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note 49 (describing the newly-emerging problem solving courts, such
as drug treatment courts, domestic violence courts, mental health courts, and other related ap-
proaches to problem solving judging, and showing how judges can use Therapeutic Jurisprudence
not only in specialized problem solving courts, but in general civil and criminal judicial forums as
well).
58. In addition to the decisions cited in supra note 56, in which the Children & Youth Law
Clinic has relied on Therapeutic Jurisprudence principles and arguments to effectuate the reform
of juvenile court procedures and rules, a number of other Florida appellate rulings have recog-
nized that the therapeutic interests of children and families are of paramount importance in court
proceedings and have implicitly or explicitly credited Therapeutic Jurisprudence for this insight.
See, e.g., Amendment to Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure, Fla. R. Juv. P 8.100(A), 796 So. 2d
470 (Fla. 2001) (recognizing the deleterious therapeutic consequences for juveniles of video con-
ference arraignments in delinquency proceedings); In re Report of the Family Court Steering
Committee, 794 So. 2d 518, 519-20 (Fla. 2001) (adopting "therapeutic justice" as a primary goal
of Florida's unified family court, and stressing the importance of "embracing methods of resolv-
ing disputes that do not cause additional emotional harm to the children and families who are re-
quired to interact with the judicial system.").
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priate to apply the theoretical approaches of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in
our teaching and practice missions.
David Wexler has observed that, "Therapeutic Jurisprudence scholar-
ship recognizes the crucial importance of empirical inquiry to test the accu-
racy of its speculations."59 Because of its theoretical nature, the scholarship
invites study of its assumptions and their practical applications. "Law
school clinics provide an experiential setting that is a natural laboratory for
applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence. As a theory whose purpose is to study
the impacts of law on individual well-being, Therapeutic Jurisprudence can
enhance clinical practice and its educational, service, and law reform mis-
sions. ''
B. PREVENTIVE LAW
The lawyering techniques of preventive law originated years before
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, conceived as a "harm-averse movement" within
the legal profession that explicitly seeks to intervene in legal matters before
disputes arise.6' It is a proactive approach to the legal profession, empha-
sizing the lawyer's role as a "planner" and proposing the "careful, private
ordering of affairs as a method of avoiding the high costs of litigation and
ensuring desired outcomes and opportunities. 62
In our Clinic's experience, we have woven preventive law concepts
into our teaching curriculum, and have found that they are particularly
well-suited for the types of cases that our Clinic handles.63 We regularly
used preventive law techniques in our meetings with George. For example,
we conducted regular "legal checkups" with George, usually in anticipation
of the six-month judicial review hearings before the Court or the Citizen
Review Panels, which addressed a range of permanency, mental health,
health, and education related questions.' The process of conducting legal
checkups in preventive law is in many ways analogous to the primary care
59. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Culture of Critique, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 269 (1999), reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 14, at 454.
60. Mary Berkheiser, Frasier Meets CLEA: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Law School
Clinics, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 1147, 1171 (1999).
61. Daicoff, supra note 50, at 1.
62. Integrating Preventive Law, supra note 15, at 6.
63. See id. at 40-43 (describing ways of integrating preventive law/Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence methodology into courses on legal process, lawyering skills classes, and law school clin-
ics).
64. See FLA. STAT. § 39.701(2) (2004) (describing the judicial review process and the role of
citizen review panels in performing semi-annual statutory reviews of the status of foster children).
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physician's process of conducting medical checkups with patients.65 In our
Clinic's cases, this analogy is particularly apropos, given the fact that so
many of the legal needs of our clients often directly implicate the state's
obligation to meet their health care needs under federal and state law.66
Performing legal checkups in George's case had both a planning func-
tion and a therapeutic function. It gave us a structured opportunity to sit
down with our client and review the progress that he, his mother, and the
65. See generally HARDAWAY, supra note 13, at xxxvii; see also Forrest S. Mosten, Unbun-
dling of Legal Services and the Family Lawyer, 28 FAM. L.Q. 421,440 (1994).
66. Advocacy for foster care children with health care issues is particularly important and
especially well-suited to the approach of preventive law. The health care problems of these chil-
dren are far more acute and chronic than their peers who grow up in intact families, and when
these children exit foster care, they often have serious difficulties accessing health care. See gen-
erally Abigail English & Kathy Grasso, The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999: Enhancing
Youth Access to Health Care, July/August CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 217
(2000) (describing the multiple, complex physical and mental health needs of young people in
foster care, the barriers to health care that they experience upon leaving care, and the expanded
Medicaid options available to states under the Chafee Program for former foster care youth ages
18-2 1); see also 42 U.S.C. § § 677(b)(3)(A)-(B), 1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii)(XVII) (2004).
A number of other child advocacy offices have thus focused their efforts on health care
advocacy utilizing tools and instruments that enable them to conduct preventive law check-ups
concerning their clients. Probably the leading exponent of this technique in Florida is the Legal
Aid Society of the Orange County Bar Association, which has devised a series of standardized
forms designed to help staff attorneys and pro bono lawyers identify and obtain services for their
child clients. The program utilizes a one-page Child Progress Worksheet as a tool to track
whether mandated or recommended independent living, health care, mental health, educational,
counseling, developmental and other mandated or needed services have been provided by DCF
for the child. Additionally, staff and pro bono lawyers utilize a very comprehensive 17-page
Home Visit Checklist which they use to conduct a detailed survey of the child's placement, edu-
cational needs, health care needs, permanency needs, and general legal issues relating to the
child's foster care status. The health care survey covers a gamut of important health care needs of
clients. See Child Progress Worksheet and Home Visit Checklist (on file with author).
According to Legal Aid staff attorney Heather Morcroft, the standardized forms used by
the staff and pro bono lawyers are an efficient method for tracking the needs of more than 650
foster care children in their case docket, including the 25% who are older teens. The forms aid
the lawyers in not only their courtroom advocacy for the clients, but also in non-adversarial set-
tings, such as case plan and school staffing conferences. Telephone Interview with Heather Mor-
croft, Esq., Staff Attorney, Legal Aid (September 30, 2004).
Although the Children & Youth Law Clinic has not yet developed as comprehensive and
detailed a case tracking form as that developed by Legal Aid, the Community Health Rights Edu-
cation Clinic at the University of Miami School of Law's Center for Public Service, which I also
supervise, has created a similarly detailed intake instrument designed to gather health care infor-
mation to assist clients with their unmet needs. The Center's health rights clinic is an integrated
teaching, research, and community service program providing health rights education and advo-
cacy to under-served communities in cooperation with the Schools of Nursing and Medicine. The
education and training regimens include a law student-conducted health benefit eligibility inter-
view and investigation ("health rights checkup") in consultation with supervising clinical faculty,
a student-patient informational discussion of benefit eligibility and problem solving approaches to
ineligibility, and direct assistance to the patient by students and faculty through self-help advising
and, when appropriate, advocacy.
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Department of Children and Families had made over the preceding months
in achieving the goals of his court-ordered permanency case plan.67 As he
approached his eighteenth birthday, in particular, we strove to use the plan-
ning process to help our client identify the goals that he would need to meet
so that he had the skills and support systems in place on his eighteenth
birthday and could make a smooth transition from foster care to independ-
ence. 68 It also served a therapeutic function as it was an opportunity for
him "to reevaluate his ... current life situation relative to his ... goals, and
to think about and plan for the immediate and distant future.
69
Working with George to plan for his future needs bore many resem-
blances to the process described by Dennis Stolle, et al.,7" in the context of
using the model to counsel and prepare legal documents for elder clients.
The scenario portrays a couple nearing retirement who consult with an at-
torney to draft estate planning documents, and the Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence/preventive lawyer's consideration of, not just the narrow economic
and legal concerns involved in drafting the estate plan documents, but also
the client's personal goals, values, and relationships. Our approach to the
permanency and independent living planning process for George, as he
neared emancipation from foster care, also strove to use preventive law
techniques and to be sensitive to the therapeutic implications of the plan.
Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law with our teenage
client as he approached his eighteenth birthday differed in some significant
ways from the process described by Stolle and his co-authors with respect
to estate planning for the elder clients approaching the milestone of retire-
ment. The most obvious differences in representing a teenager in foster
care as opposed to an elder client approaching retirement at the end of his
professional career are the differences in age, economic and social status,
cultural identity, life experience, and developmental status.7 A lawyer rep-
67. See FLA. STAT. § 39.701(7)(a), (8) (2004) (describing the scope of review by the court or
the citizen review panel in assessing the status of the child in the six-month judicial review hear-
ing, and the role of the court or panel in determining compliance by all parties with the perma-
nency case plan).
68. See generally UNIV. OF OK., NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR YOUTH
DEVELOPMENT, PERMANENCY PLANNING: CREATING LIFE-LONG CONNECTIONS-WHAT DOES
IT MEAN FOR ADOLESCENTS? (2000) available at http://www.nrcys.ou.edu [hereinafter WHAT
DOES IT MEAN FOR ADOLESCENTS?].
69. Integrating Preventive Law, supra note 15, at 17.
70. Id. at 11 (observing that that preventive lawyers should be able to use client counseling
skills to quickly bring out information regarding the elder clients' "age, health conditions, family
structure, vocations, and avocations, all of which may prove to be critical information in drafting
a document to distribute their assets in accord with their intent," but can also "be used to alert the
preventive lawyer to any potential therapeutic concerns.").
71. See DANIEL J. BRANNEN, DEBUNKING THE YEAR 18 MYTH: RIGHTING THE WAY FOR
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resenting a teenager will also need to use different modes of communica-
tion in counseling this client, as opposed to an elder client.72 But there are
many commonalities that lawyers for elder clients and children will use in
applying the creative problem solving techniques of the Therapeutic
Jurisprudence/preventive law approach-at different ends of the age,
cultural, racial, and social status spectrums.73
Although our Therapeutic Jurisprudence/preventive law approach fo-
cused primarily on using periodic legal checkups to plan for the immediate
and future needs of our client, by no means did this strategy preclude the
Clinic from pursuing litigation where necessary. 74 For example, we did not
hesitate, at one critically urgent juncture, to file a motion and supporting
affidavit asking the juvenile court judge to hold DCF in contempt of court
when the agency flouted a case plan by failing to deliver promised services
according to the timetable set out in the court-approved permanency case
AMERICA'S FOSTER YOUTH-AN ADVOCACY STRATEGY 3 (Nov. 2002), available at
http://www.kidsathome.org./yearl8.html (describing the economic and life circumstances unique
to 18-year-olds discharged from foster care, especially in light of U.S. Census Bureau data show-
ing that the overwhelming majority of Americans do not become economically self-sufficient
until they reach their 25th birthdays); Mark E. Courtney et al., Foster Youth Transitions to Adult-
hood: A Longitudinal View of Youth Leaving Care, 80 CHILD. WELFARE 685 (2001) (tracking
the myriad difficulties experienced by youth aging out of foster care in the areas of family sup-
port, independent living, education, medical insurance coverage, employment, criminal court in-
volvement etc.); see also Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence
in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 33-34 (2001) (exploring the role culture plays in lawyering
and illustrating methods that clinical teachers can use to build cross-cultural skills); Bill Ong
Hing, Symposium, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sex-
ual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807
(1993) (explaining why the effective community lawyer must be conscious of and sensitive to the
class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, physical disability, and age of the various players
in the legal environment and describing how these sensitivities can be taught in a law school
clinic).
72. See WALKER, supra note 8, at 5. Walker observes that
[a]dults have a higher expectation of adolescents' ability to understand the convoluted
language typical of court proceedings, and improbable responses to questions such as
'How many times did it happen?' ... Adolescents are, in fact, in some ways at greater
risk than young children of misjudgment, and we would do well to keep that in mind.
Id.
73. See Integrating Preventive Law, supra note 15, at 16.
Ultimately, a TJ preventive lawyer can ensure therapeutic outcomes through the care-
ful use of preventive tools. By considering not only economic and legal priorities, but
also personal goals, values, and relationships, a lawyer can create a superior package
of preventive legal documents that ... can both reduce the potential for anti-
therapeutic outcomes down the road and maximize the older client's present sense of
security and autonomy.
Id.
74. See Bruce J. Winick, The Expanding Scope of Preventive Law, 3 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 189,
202-03 (2002) (describing the use of litigation as a preventive law strategy).
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plan.75 Rather than shunning litigation, there were occasions such as the
contempt proceeding when we viewed litigation as an important preventive
law tool and as a creative problem solving strategy to prevent the occur-
rence of even more grave problems in our client's life.
Thus, we were able to make extensive use of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence/preventive law techniques in our representation of our client by en-
gaging him in joint decision-making strategies such as permanency plan-
ning, evaluating his long-term goals and interests and how to achieve them
while minimizing the risk of legal difficulties and maximizing our client's
therapeutic interests and values, and, when warranted, utilizing litigation to
avert more serious legal problems.
IV. THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND PREVENTIVE LAW
APPLIED: LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR GEORGE C.
In one of the first published articles to look at the infusion of Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence into clinical legal education, Professor Mary Berk-
heiser observed that Therapeutic Jurisprudence holds great promise for cli-
nicians in teaching problem solving, client-counseling, self-reflection, and
professional responsibility.76 Professor Berkheiser also identified a number
of practical difficulties in teaching Therapeutic Jurisprudence and applying
its theoretical assumptions and values in the clinical education setting. Her
critique questioned whether clinicians can teach law students to be psycho-
logically competent while also teaching substantive law and basic legal
skills; whether the term "therapeutic" is too vague to be grasped by stu-
dents; and whether promoting a client's therapeutic interests in the clinic
75. See id. at 203.
Like business and estate planning, litigation becomes an opportunity for preventive
lawyering. Litigation thus is not an occasion for abandoning the preventive law proc-
ess, but simply is one of a number of facts of life that must be dealt with by the pre-
ventive lawyer. These facts can be addressed in ways that minimize future problems
and provide the client with an improved holistic understanding of and more creative
solutions for the dispute in which he is involved.
Id.
76. See Berkheiser, supra note 60, at 1148. Berkheiser notes that
Law school clinics could bring to Therapeutic Jurisprudence what that field may be
lacking-the ability to reach and educate future members of the bar and bench and to
apply Therapeutic Jurisprudence principles in ways that can improve the lives of their
clients. The precise benefits that Therapeutic Jurisprudence can offer to clinical teach-
ing and at what costs, however, remain less clear.
Id.; see also Gould & Perlin, supra note 20, at 355 (noting that Therapeutic Jurisprudence en-
riches clinical teaching by improving the teaching of skills, giving clinicians a better understand-
ing of the dynamics of clinical relationships, investigating ethical concerns and the effect on
lawyering roles, and invigorating the way teachers and students question accepted legal practice).
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ultimately subordinates the promotion of due process and justice values.77
The experience of practicing and teaching the Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence perspective in our Clinic suggests that these techniques did not re-
quire the clinic to sacrifice other skills teaching or normative values associ-
ated with clinical legal education and the lawyering process itself. Indeed,
we consistently found that we could have it both ways. By engaging in
four "rewind exercises," designed to review and critique some of our activ-
ity in George's case, the balance of this article offers anecdotal case exam-
ples or vignettes of how clinical legal education, and a children's advocacy
clinic, can benefit and learn from the teaching and practice of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence.7"
A. FIRST REWIND EXERCISE-SETTING GOALS: REUNIFICATION,
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OR LONG-TERM FOSTER CARE
The judge in George's dependency foster care case had appointed our
Clinic to serve as his attorney ad litem.79 The court was primarily con-
cerned that George had been languishing in foster care for far too long and
that federal and state law required the court, after the passage of nearly
77. See Berkheiser, supra note 60, at 1167-68 (citing Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193, 201 (1995)).
78. See Better Legal Counseling, supra note 14 (describing the "rewind" technique as a dis-
cussion of an appellate case in which the class rewinds the situation back to the stage of drafting,
and asks "what might have been done differently to avoid the legal problem presented in the
case.").
79. The Clinic was appointed pursuant to Florida Statute chapter 39.4085(20) and Rule 8.217
of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, to serve as George's attorney ad litem. See FLA.
STAT. § 39.4085(20) (2004); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.217. In representing its clients, the Clinic follows
ethical guidelines recommended by the American Bar Association. See ABA, STANDARDS OF
PRAC. FOR LAWS.WHo REPRESENT CHILD. IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (1996) [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA STANDARDS promote a traditional role for attorneys in their repre-
sentation of children, which requires the lawyer to advocate for the client's articulated wishes and
legal interests within the bounds of the law. See ABA STANDARDS at A- 1 (defining the term
"child's attorney" as "a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who owes the same
duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due an
adult client."); see also ANN M. HARALAMBIE, THE CHILD'S ATTORNEY: A GUIDE TO
REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CUSTODY, ADOPTION, AND CHILD PROTECTION CASES 5-14 (1993)
(distinguishing the role of a child's attorney from the best interests advocacy role performed by a
guardian ad litem or the role of the attorney for the guardian ad litem); Bruce A. Green & Bernar-
dine Dohrn, Children and the Ethical Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1294-95
(1996). Green and Dorhn note that
[g]iven the choice, a lawyer should elect to represent the child as a lawyer, not to un-
dertake the role of guardian ad litem. And, when the lawyer is assigned the role of
guardian ad litem, the lawyer should, to the extent legally permissible, serve in the
same manner as would the child's lawyer.
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twelve years in state custody, to order the state to commence a termination
of parental rights proceeding or reunify George with his parent.80
The students prepared a report and memorandum for the court dis-
cussing the permanent placement options available to the court under fed-
eral and state law. Consistent with George's wishes, the Clinic advocated
that the goal of the permanency case plan for the client remain long-term
licensed care, with a concurrent goal of independent living, as opposed to
termination of parental rights and adoption. Alternatively, we argued, the
court should move forward to reunify our client with his mother.
The argument in the Clinic's memorandum essentially was that there
were compelling reasons not to require a termination of parental rights, and
that federal law permitted the court to consider a number of other altema-
tive placement options. 1 The legal argument derived from what our client
had told us about his continuing attachment to his mother and his desire to
maintain that relationship with her, for better or worse. It incorporated an
analysis of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act ("ASFA"). 82 ASFA
allows a state agency to consider permanency options other than termina-
tion of parental rights for a child who has been in foster care for more than
twelve months, or 15 out of the previous 22 months, where the state can
document in the child's case plan a compelling reason not to file the termi-
nation petition, based on a finding that it would not be in the child's best
interests.83
The subtext to the statutory argument was a Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence argument, which considered the negative impact that an adversarial
termination of parental rights proceeding could have on George's emo-
tional life and well-being, particularly if it did not result in an eventual
adoption (an unlikely outcome, given his age and special needs).84
The judge listened to the student and heard from our client. It was the
first time in more than ten years that George had appeared before the judge
in his foster care case. It was the first time that he had ever had his own in-
dependent legal representative participating in the proceedings. 85  The
80. See Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, § 101, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (1997)); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(l)(e) (2001).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2005).
82. See sources cited supra note 80.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(ii) (2005).
84. See Brooks, supra note 20, at 955 (noting that "[bloth 'best interests' and permanency
have come to mean an undue emphasis on adoption and adherence to a rigid time frame, neither
of which fits with a truly therapeutic approach to children and families.").
85. George was unique in having court-appointed counsel to represent him in this proceed-
ing. Most foster youth in Florida and Miami-Dade lack access to legal counsel. Only one full-
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judge ruled that, "TPR [termination of parental rights] is not in the manifest
best interests because the child is bonded to the mother and the child has
special needs."86
In time, we would have second thoughts about advising our client to
pursue this case plan objective. As discussed below, his relationship with
his mother became fractured and troubled over time because he had more
contact with her in the community-based foster care setting than he did
while living inside the hospital setting. And as he drifted from foster home
to foster home over the next three years, he lost the ability to form attach-
ments with adults, including parental figures.87 Surely, other permanency
options, such as open adoption or guardianship, could have been presented
to our client and pursued more aggressively in court.8"
In rewinding this phase of our representation, I regret that we did not
explore other permanency placement options for George that would help
him form meaningful attachments to important adults in his life. Instead,
George languished for three more years in foster care, until his eighteenth
birthday, forging very few lasting bonds with important adults while his at-
tachments to his mother and other family members became more tenuous
and strained over time (due largely to the absence of meaningful family re-
time attorney employed by the Legal Aid Society of the Dade County Bar Association and two
attorneys at the Children & Youth Law Clinic provide legal representation on a consistent basis to
the more than 1500 older foster youth in District 11 (Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties). In the
state of Florida there are fewer than 20 full-time children's lawyers representing more than
600,000 children living in poverty. See Mark D. Killian, Fee Statements on the Way: Members
Asked to Support 'Challenge for Children,' FLA. B. NEWS , May 15, 2003 (quoting Florida Bar
President-elect Miles McGrane), available at http://www.flabar.org.
86. Judge's order on file with author.
87. Perhaps this was a result of the court's inability to consider factors beyond just the best
interests of the child. As Joseph Goldstein, Ana Freud, and Albert Solnit discuss in their work,
family and juvenile courts need to give dispositive weight to a child's attachments to psychologi-
cal parents in making custody determinations. See generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL.,
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973) (noting that the law should make the child's
and not the parent's needs paramount and that permanency of relationship is the first and most
important developmental need of a child). Sadly, however, our client never forged strong rela-
tionships with either his immediate family members or his psychological parents, which undoubt-
edly stunted his adolescent development and maturation.
88. Our students' memorandum to the court noted the available range of options under fed-
eral law, including reunification with parent, 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (2005), legal guardian-
ship with a non-relative, 42 U.S.C. § 675(7) (2005), custodial placement with a relative, 42
U.S.C. §§ 675(5)(C), 671(a)(19) (2005). In the end, these options proved to be meager, as our
client's connections to his family and other "dedicated" adults became more attenuated over time,
an unfortunate fact of life for many older children in foster care. See, e.g., Mangold, supra note
28, at 877-79 (criticizing both the Adoption and Safe Families Act and the Chafee Foster Care
Independence Act for leaving gaps in permanency alternatives for older teens and recommending
open adoption and guardianship as non-exclusive parenting options which need to be permitted
and subsidized by federal government and states for older children in foster care).
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unification efforts by DCF and his mother's inability to benefit from those
token reunification efforts that the Department provided).89 Yet, from a
pedagogical standpoint, counseling the client about these issues enriched
the clinical experience for our students and, I believe, enriched the relation-
ship that the students had with our client. Repeatedly, we confronted not
just legal but psychological and family issues in counseling and represent-
ing our client.
The anxiety and distress that our client experienced from being in
long-term foster care, coupled with anger directed at his mother and the le-
gal system, often challenged our Clinic interns to go beyond the narrow
boundaries of the traditional lawyer-client relationship. The students con-
fronted the human element of legal counseling and became more psycho-
logically sensitive to his developmental needs and limitations as they coun-
seled and advocated for our adolescent client. George exhibited many of
the mood swings, impulsive actions, social immaturity, and risky behaviors
typically associated with adolescence. Because he was growing up in the
foster care system without any stable parental guidance or involvement,
events in his life (which at times, he could neither control nor comprehend)
magnified these normal developmental experiences.9"
In addition to regular court hearings related to his foster care status,
George had several brushes with the juvenile justice system, which exacer-
bated his feelings of loss of control. He was arrested several times and de-
tained in the Miami-Dade Juvenile Detention Center. Our visits with him
at the detention center were often very difficult, as he was in a state of pro-
found depression and confusion. The hearings in the delinquency court did
not assuage his depressed and confused feelings. They often deteriorated
into circus-like histrionic exhibitions on the part of George and his mother,
as he witnessed and responded to her bizarre emotional lamentations to the
judge and the courtroom about his worsening legal problems.
89. See SHIRK & STANGLER, supra note 1, at 264 (observing that many youth who age out of
foster care maintain relationships with their families, and quite a few even return to them, and
recommending that foster care systems must recognize the pull of family and find a way to create
federal and state financial incentives for reunification and post-reunification services).
90. See, e.g., Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the De-
velopment of Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEV. REV. 1, 28-29 (noting the adolescent's
limited future planning capacities, which continue to develop until the early twenties); see also
Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Why Ado-
lescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 741, 748, 754 & tbl. 4 (2000)
(in a study comparing maturity of judgment in adolescents and adults, finding that twelfth-graders
with mean age of 17.5 scored lower than young adults on ability to see short and long-term con-
sequences of their actions, significantly lower on "impulse control," and significantly lower on
overall measures of psychosocial maturity).
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George also missed many days of school while attending hearings at
the courthouse for his accumulating delinquency charges and the periodic
court reviews of his foster care status. The juvenile courthouse became a
second home to George, and he was one of the more familiar denizens of
that building to the bailiffs and other court officials. It was a perverse and
chaotic environment to grow up in. His many unhappy interactions with
the different divisions of the juvenile court (dependency and delinquency)
and the juvenile justice and foster care systems made him feel marginalized
and powerless.91 Lacking stable parental control and guidance, feeling con-
stantly at the mercy of an ever-changing array of foster parents, juvenile
probation officers, child welfare social workers and judges, and lacking any
sense of a permanent home or family, he was often overwhelmed with feel-
ings of "learned helplessness."92
Studies of adolescents growing up in foster care have shown that the
typical developmental problems associated with adolescence are particu-
larly turbulent for these children and frequently trying for their caretakers.93
91. See Barbara A. Babb, A Unified Family Court, in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, su-
pra note 49, at 294-97 (arguing for the establishment of unified family courts that embrace Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence and "an ecological, holistic approach to a family's problems."); see also In
re Report of the Family Court Steering Committee, 794 So. 2d at 519-20 (reaffirming the Florida
Supreme Court's goal of implementing a "fully integrated, comprehensive approach to handling
all cases involving children and families."); Claudia Wright, Representation of Children in a Uni-
fied Family Court System in Florida, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 179, 189-91 (2003) (describ-
ing the role of counsel for children subject to multiple, concurrent legal proceedings in a unified
family court system).
92. See MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, HELPLESS: ON DEPRESSION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEATH
xvii (1992) (discussing learned helplessness as a social psychology theory which consists of
"[f]irst, an environment in which some important outcome is beyond control; second, the re-
sponse of giving up; and third, the accompanying cognition: the expectation that no voluntary
action can control the outcome.").
93. A recent study published by the University of Oklahoma National Resource Center for
Youth Development on the problems of adolescents in foster care notes that the normal pattern of
identity crisis, experimentation and rebellion associated with adolescence is particularly difficult
for foster care youth:
Adolescence is a turbulent time, marked by emerging sexuality and rebelliousness. It
is the time period in which one gains the skills needed to transition from childhood to
adulthood. Though they no longer want to be treated as children, adolescents do not
yet possess the skills needed to be an adult in our society. For adolescents in foster
care, this difficult time period can become even more confusing and particularly try-
ing for caretakers.
Because these young people do not have the security of their own home the opposi-
tion may be focused on service providers or foster parents - or may be internalized
and expressed as risky behaviors such as drug use or promiscuity. While adolescents
are rebellious with adults, they seem to be overly compliant with peers. At the same
time they have a strong need to belong in a family and to be taken seriously. Without
this, it is difficult for them to successfully accomplish the tasks that face them during
these turbulent years. The adolescent is trying to answer four questions: 1) Who am
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One of our roles as his lawyers during these difficult periods was to help
him navigate through the different court proceedings and to be an anchor in
times when he felt a loss of control.94 We did so by giving him information
about the various pending court cases, his legal rights, the court system, the
proceedings, and what to expect in the legal process. 95 Being able to count
on our Clinic as a consistent source of reliable information about his legal
status allayed some of his stress and reassured him that we would always
be there for him. Thus, the process of performing legal checkups and giv-
ing our client information about his court proceedings help him gain con-
trol over the stressful and disorienting feeling of being adrift in the legal
system.96
Applying the principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and putting
them into practice also gave our students the sensitivities to help our client
understand these feelings of distress and disempowerment, and motivated
them to devise counseling strategies to help him overcome them.97 The cli-
I?, 2) Where do I belong?, [3)] What can I do?, and [4)] What do I believe in? Ado-
lescents in foster care need help to find these answers for themselves, as well as, in-
formation about their past in order to fill in the gaps about their roots/history.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR ADOLESCENTS?, supra note 68, at 12. See also Mary Elizabeth
Collins, Transition to Adulthood for Vulnerable Youth: A Review of Research and Implications
for Policy, 2001 Soc. Sci. Rev. 271.
94. At times in the lawyer-client relationship with George, we had to stand back to make sure
that he understood the boundaries of our relationship and to convey that he needed stabilizing
forces in his life other than his attorney. See PETERS, supra note 7, at 211. Peters states that
[it is healthy for a lawyer to remember throughout the lawyer-client relationship that
he is usually a transient player in the life of the child. Keeping in mind the end of the
relationship and the need for the client to move beyond a time when the lawyer's ser-
vices are acutely needed helps the lawyer keep in perspective his relationships with
other professionals and helps him to continue to take actions with a client that are
commensurate with his transient passage through the child's world.
Id.
95. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 79, at § A-3 ("The lawyer has an obligation to explain
clearly, precisely, and in terms the client can understand the meaning and consequences of ac-
tion."); Id. at § B-1(5) (child's attorney should "[c]ounsel the child about the subject matter of the
litigation, the child's rights, the court system, the proceedings, the lawyer's role, and what to ex-
pect in the legal process."). See also Bruce J. Winick, Symposium, Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and the Role of Counsel in Litigation, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 105, 109-10 (2000) (describing the
lawyer's role in providing information to the client about the meaning of the various stages of the
litigation process and noting how giving information to the client can help to reduce the feelings
of intense stress that litigants frequently experience in this process).
96. Social cognition literature places emphasis on "information control," the perception of
control that results when an individual obtains information relating to a stressful situation or
event. See Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 46-47 (1999) (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR,
SOCIAL COGNITION 122 (1984)) [hereinafter Civil Commitment Hearing].
97. See, e.g., Better Legal Counseling supra note 14, at 69-79 (describing use of strategies to
identify and overcome psycholegal soft spots in "areas where legal intervention or procedures
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ent's anxiety and helplessness inevitably posed many challenges and many
of our interactions with George focused on helping him build on his per-
sonal strengths and develop self-efficacy skills to learn to confront and to
solve these probldms. 9s
Consistent with our "client-centered" approach to counseling and rep-
resentation, we worked to make sure that our client had the right informa-
tion to make the important decisions. We respected his individual auton-
omy, avoided paternalism, provided advice based on his values, sought out
the potential non-legal consequences of decisions, acknowledged his feel-
ings and recognized their importance, and fostered decision-making on his
part through periodic checkups and other regular communications. 9  At
each juncture in his case, we scrupulously sought his input and direction,
helping him to reach the best decision about his case. We also enforced his
may not lead to a lawsuit or to legal vulnerability, but may lead to anxiety, distress, depression,
hard and hurt feelings, etc."); see also Gould & Perlin, supra note 20, at 356 (noting that Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence gives the clinical law student the tools to recognize and problem-solve is-
sues of stress in a clinical setting, which "can be a stressful place or, at best, a place filled with
stressed people."). In incorporating these techniques into counseling, the Clinic, at times, also
assumed a quasi-"caregiver" role with our client to help him build self-esteem and feel in control
of his life. See Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in Con-
text, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1504 (1996) (stressing the roles of education, connection and
voice in the lawyer-child client relationship but cautioning the child's lawyer to avoid assuming a
surrogate parent role, which "can only stifle the client's voice and prompt the kind of overreach-
ing which commentators who favor limitations on the lawyer's role criticize.").
98. See Shadd Maruna & Thomas P. LeBel, Welcome Home?: Examining the "Reentry
Court" Concept from a Strengths-Based Perspective, 4 W. CRIM. REV. 2 (2003), available at
http://wcr.sonoma.edu/v4nl/v4nl .htm, reprinted in JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY, supra note
49, at 255 (explaining strength-based approaches in the context of convict re-entry into society,
noting "strengths-based or restorative approaches ask not what a person's deficits are, but rather
what positive contribution the person can make"); see also Michael D. Clarke, Change-Focused
Youth Work: The Critical Ingredients of Positive Behavioral Change, 3 J. CTR. FOR FAMILIES,
CHILD. & CTS. 59 (2001), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs
/cfcc/pdffiles/V3Clark.pdf (studying research on improving the effectiveness of the therapeutic
approach in inducing positive behavioral change in adolescents).
99. For discussions of the concept of client-centered counseling, which is based on deference
to client autonomy and is designed to foster client decision making, see DAVID A. BINDER, ET AL.
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH, SECOND ED. 8-13 (2004) (describ-
ing the hallmarks of client-centered counseling and integrating client-centered counseling into the
interviewing and counseling process); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH,
INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION
334-38 (1990); Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement,
32 ARIz. L. REV. 501 (1990). For a discussion of the therapeutic (client-centered therapy, or
Rogerian) derivations of this legal counseling model, which are based on the premise that indi-
viduals can achieve full potential or self-actualization when facilitated by a helping, empathic,
and nonjudgmental person, see Bruce J. Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance
Directive Context: Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identify and Deal With a Psycholegal Soft
Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 901, 916-17 (1998) [hereinafter Client Denial]; see also infra
note 136.
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legal rights by striving to make sure that he was involved in all of the sig-
nificant permanency and independent living planning decisions, a require-
ment of federal law for states that receive Chafee Program funding.l'0
Thus, our Clinic was more than just the client's law enforcer. The
Clinic was his therapeutic agent, facilitating his ability to be heard by deci-
sion-makers with regard to his permanency and independent living needs.
By assuming this dual role of law enforcer and therapeutic agent, the Clinic
helped give him a "voice" in the process and a feeling of "validation" from
the experience of participating in that process: outcomes that have been
identified as particularly important in a number of significant social psy-
chological research studies of litigant participation in the legal process.
The empirical research on how litigants experience judicial and ad-
ministrative hearings has generated an extensive body of literature on the
psychology of procedural justice.'0 ' The research on the psychology of
100. The federal law mandates that states involve foster care youth in a manner equal to any
other community stakeholder in designing program activities. Each state must also certify that
these young adults have "participated directly in designing their own program activities that help
them for independent living and that the adolescents accept responsibility for living up to their
part of the program." 42 U.S.C. § 677(b)(3)(H) (2005). See also supra notes 45, 47 and accom-
panying text.
The Chafee Program recognizes that young adults must play a part in determining the ser-
vices needed to help them achieve self-sufficiency. In his statement to the House Committee on
Ways and Means, Mark Kroner, Director of Self-Sufficiency Services for Lighthouse Youth Ser-
vices in Ohio, stressed that, "[t]he teens coming through our program taught us what they needed
to do and learn in order to become more self-sufficient. Sometimes it meant letting them make
dozens of crazy mistakes and foolish choices...." Foster Care Independent Living, supra note
28 (Testimony of Mark Kroner), also available at http://www.cwla.org/advocacy (last visited
Feb. 12, 2005) (emphasis added). These views and recommendations were for the most part sec-
onded by the foster care youth themselves. See, e.g., Amy Clay, Assisting a Youth in Transition,
18 ABA CHILD L. PRAC. 65 (October 1999) (presenting a foster care graduate's view of her ex-
periences with independent living classes and foster care); see also Abigail English & Kathi
Grasso, supra note 66 (discussing the statement of Terry Harrak, former foster care child, during
the Health Needs of Children in the Foster Care System (Health Needs of Children in the Foster
Care System Hearing on S. 1327 Before the Subcommittee on Health Care of the Senate Commit-
tee on Finance, 103d Cong.(1999)) regarding her need for a network of support and health insur-
ance coverage when she left state foster care); see also Cheryl Wetzstein, Senate Panel Mulls
Foster Care Reform; 'Aged Out' Youths Testifi, on Problems of Independent Living,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A4.
Relying on this testimony and the recommendations of the 1999 GAO Report, the Chafee
Program encourages states to provide youth training in areas such as money management, health
and safety, nutrition education, grocery shopping, housekeeping, parenting education, family
planning, community transportation, driver's education, and interpersonal and social skills. The
crucial point, captured by Senator Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), is to provide a "safe, stable, and
nurturing environment" while they are "still learning these valuable life skills." 145 CONG. REC.
S15, 227-01 (1999); see also Mangold, supra note 28.
101. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE (1988); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990); E. Allan Lind et al.,
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procedural justice suggests that people are more satisfied with and will
comply more with the outcome of legal proceedings when they perceive
those proceedings to be fair and are afforded an opportunity to participate
in them.
The procedural justice research establishes that litigants value the
process or dignitary goals of a hearing. People who feel that they have
been treated fairly at a hearing, dealt with in good faith and with respect
and dignity by the tribunal and other participants in the hearing, are more
satisfied with the hearing than those who feel that they have been treated
unfairly, with disrespect, and in bad faith. Litigants place a premium on
"voice," the ability to tell their story to the judge, and "validation," the feel-
ing that the judge or other decision-maker has listened to them and has
given serious consideration to their opinions and views.
Even when the hearing outcome is negative, people treated fairly, in
good faith, and with respect, experience greater satisfaction with the result
and are more likely to comply with the decision rendered by the court.
Moreover, they will perceive the decision of the court as less coercive than
when the tribunal fails to treat them with respect and dignity. They may
even feel they have voluntarily chosen the course that is handed down by
the judge. These feelings of "voluntariness" rather than coercion tend to
produce greater compliance with the results of the hearing and promote
more positive behavioral change.
In observing how George was often treated by his caregivers and the
many decision-makers who exercised dominion and control over his life
both before and after our Clinic was appointed as his attorney ad litem, our
students noted how excluding him from the process, without first giving
him opportunity to heard, denied him both voice and validation. In fact, it
thrust upon him decisions largely made in his absence by these profession-
als without any input from him.
Before our Clinic started representing George, he was routinely ex-
cluded from decision-making deliberations that took place in court and be-
hind closed doors in administrative staffings. This exclusionary, in absen-
tia process of decision-making unquestionably had negative or anti-
therapeutic effects on his relationships with the many foster care case
workers, probation officers, and other gatekeepers involved in the case
planning and the implementation of plans governing his delinquency or
Voice, Control, and Procedural Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness
Judgments, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952 (1990); John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A
Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REv. 541 (1978).
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foster care status, a not uncommon experience for foster children.' °2 It also
clearly had a negative effect on his perception of the fairness of the legal
and administrative process.
It is no wonder, then, that report after report, which the social work-
ers, therapists, and other professionals submitted to the court, described
George as displaying "oppositional and defiant behavior, depressive symp-
toms, including depressed mood, difficulty sleeping, and social isola-
tion."'0 3 In our class and case discussions, our students observed that many
of these symptoms were understandable responses or reactions to how he
was treated. George's pervasive feeling of sadness and despair about hav-
ing been given no say in the matter was, in fact, justified by the way he was
treated by the adults in the many foster care homes, schools, inpatient hos-
pitals, residential treatment centers, detention centers, and group homes
where he was sent during the more than 15 years that he spent in foster
care.
Indeed, the overwhelming consensus of empirical research confirms
the importance of including foster children in decisions about their place-
ments, schooling, services, treatment, and other matters to give them "own-
ership" of those decisions and encourage greater compliance and coopera-
tion with the decision-makers. 1°4 The end-result of not giving George any
102. See, e.g., J. Curtis McMillen et al., Independent-Living Services: The Views of Former
Foster Youth, FAMS. SOC'Y J. CONTEMP. HUMAN SERVS. 471 (Sept.-Oct. 1997) (reporting the
views of former foster youth that most did not see their caseworkers as "helpful"); see also
BINDER, supra note 99, at 4 (noting that clients are autonomous "owners" of their problems).
103. Report on file with author.
104. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE FOR DISADVANTAGED YOUTH, FINAL REPORT 26
(2003). The Task Force report states that
Federally funded state and community based programs should not only treat youth as
recipients of services, but reach out to them as partners in program planning, design,
and leadership. Youth have important talents to share and skills to learn that often fall
outside of academic curricula. Many youth know will work best for them. When they
feel ownership for a program, they are more likely to give commitment and energy.
The experience of being listened to and respected as partners can build a young per-
son's self-efficacy and help develop the characteristics of responsible adult citizenship.
Id.; CASEY FAMILY SERVICES, STRENGTHENING FAMILIES & COMMUNITIES: A FRAMEWORK
FOR INDEPENDENT LIVING 5 (2001) ("Each individual child needs to set his own goals for adult-
hood, regardless of age. The child-and his adult caretakers-needs to be optimistic that the
goals he has identified can be achieved and he needs to be empowered to achieve them.");
Miriam J. Landsman et al., Achieving Permanency for Teens: Lessons Learned From a Demon-
stration Project, NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR FAMILY CENTER PRACTICE, PREVENTION
REPORT 1999, at 16 ("It was critical for the youth to be a significant participant in the process
from the beginning. This meeting was also used to identify additional counseling needed by the
youth to understand the services or sort out his/her feelings about possible outcomes.");
FESTINGER, supra note 2, at 281. Festinger reports that
[s]ome felt left, and others felt left out: 'They always had conferences and you weren't
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sense of ownership of these types of decisions was that he fell into a spiral
of defiance, depression, and hopelessness. Eventually, in June 2000, this
resulted in his involuntary, long-term commitment to the locked psychiatric
hospital where we first met him in October 2001.
B. SECOND REWIND EXERCISE-IN THE HOSPITAL:
COMMITTED BUT NOT VOLUNTARILY
After the hearings on his permanency status, George endured a
lengthy stay in the inpatient psychiatric facility where we had first met him.
More than twenty months had passed before the treatment team in the pro-
gram began to consider that it was time to plan for his discharge to a less
restrictive foster care setting. We saw this inordinate period of confine-
ment in the treatment program as a particularly cruel and striking example
of the experience of many children in state custody."°5 Lacking parents
who care deeply for them, they are taken into state custody, where they of-
ten suffer trauma, are diagnosed with mental health disorders, and many are
warehoused and forgotten for months and years in state-run or privately-
contracted treatment programs. Even the United States Supreme Court, in
the widely criticized Parham v. JR. decision, which held that parents or the
State can commit children in their custody voluntarily to mental hospitals
without a formal due process hearing, reluctantly acknowledged that the
warehousing of these children in institutions was a problem.'06
in on it and they don't tell you what they discussed about you... then they write a re-
port and you don't know what they've said.' Some felt that general statements such as
'it's in your best interest" makes you feel like a client, not a person.' A recurrent
theme in their comments was the importance of consulting with children and allowing
them to share in, and contribute to, decisions that need to be made.
Id.; see also Chaifetz, supra note 45, at 22.
There are legal and ethical violations in failing to listen to foster care children; con-
versely, there are many advantages to providing a youth development perspective.
When a young person is heard, she learns that she can affect her environment. The
foster care client's recommendations can improve her day-to-day life in foster care and
should speed the permanency planning process to a positive conclusion. Lastly, a
young person's input is likely to enhance her ownership of her own permanency plan,
thereby increasing the likelihood of success.
Id..
105. A series of articles published in the Sun-Sentinel on November 7-10, 1999, used the
phrase "throwaway kids" to describe the experiences of hundreds of Florida foster care children
confined to state institutions for years at a time and the neglect that many of them suffered in
these institutions. See, e.g., Staff Writer, Throwaway Kids by the Hundreds, Troubled Florida
Kids are Kept, Often Unecessarily, in Psychiartic Centers, SUN-SENTtNEL (FT. LAUDERDALE,
FL), Nov. 7, 1999, at IA.
106. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 619 (1979). The Paham Court noted that
[t]he absence of an adult who cares deeply for a child has little effect on the reliability
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During the many months that he lived in the facility, George spent his
days in a locked one-floor unit on the third-floor of the drab hospital build-
ing overlooking an expressway in Hialeah, an industrial and commercial
suburb of Miami. The only outdoor activity for the patients in the unit con-
sisted of basketball games played on a hot tarmac rooftop outside of the
third-floor psychiatric unit. Only on rare occasions, when he reached a
level that accorded him more privileges, could he exit the hospital grounds
for activities associated with childhood and adolescence, such as movies or
trips to the beach. His schooling in the hospital was limited to a few hours
each day, in a self-contained program designed exclusively for severely
emotionally disturbed students, which exacerbated his feelings of isolation
from the educational mainstream inhabited by his peers outside the institu-
tion. °'
During our many visits to the program, clinic students and supervis-
ing faculty observed that George seemed quietly resigned to spending the
rest of his childhood in this self-contained therapeutic prison, behind bars
and locked doors, often brutally subjected to indignities such as the use of
seclusion and physical restraint and the forced administration of psychotro-
pic medications." 8 I cannot begin to describe how stifled and claustropho-
bic the students and I often felt as we entered the building for even a brief
of the initial admission decision, but it may have some effect on how long a child will
remain in the hospital .... For a child without natural parents we must acknowledge
the risk of being 'lost in the shuffle'.
Parham, 442 U.S. at 619. See also GARY B. MELTON ET AL., No PLACE TO Go: THE CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF MINORS 126-131, 157-58 (1998) (debunking the Parham Court's assumption
that state foster care social workers can be expected to act as real parents for all of their children
or that these children will come to perceive their caseworkers as surrogate parents). Beyond the
question of the effect and length of hospitalization on children without natural parents, Parham
has been more broadly criticized for positing the naive assumption that parents do not use mental
hospitals as a "dumping ground" (442 U.S. at 597-98), and that the state restricts use of "its costly
mental health facilities" to persons in "genuine need." Id. at 604-05. See also Lois A. Weithom,
Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40
STAN. L. REV. 773, 826 (1988) (criticizing Parham as tolerating the inappropriate use of inpatient
facilities, the result of "[a] combination of factors, including laissez-faire judicial policies, insur-
ance coverage favoring inpatient treatment, the rise or corporate medicine, a mental health estab-
lishment willing to assume control over troublesome youth, and the symbolic appeal of a medical
care perspective on deviance"); Perlmutter & Salisbury, supra note 53, at 731-37 (summarizing
research on residential treatment of "troublesome" youth in the wake of Parham); Ira C. Lupu,
Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: The Separation of Powers and
the Protection of Children, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317 (1994) (discussing Parham and the mecha-
nism for distributing decision-making authority over children).
107. Federal education law requires schools to ensure that "to the maximum extent appropri-
ate, children with disabilities.., are educated with children who are not disabled .. " 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a).
108. See MELTON, supra note 106, at 52-81 (1998) (describing the restrictiveness and intru-
siveness of residential mental health treatment programs for youth).
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visit. It was also obvious to us, from our conversations with George during
these periodic "checkups," that he yearned to be living in a less restrictive
and less intrusive setting.
Both in treatment team meetings and periodic judicial review hear-
ings, we advocated for a shortened stay in the program and for humane
treatment that respected George's dignity and legal rights as a patient. 109
We relied not only on legal arguments, but on concepts derived from
Therapeutic Jurisprudence which gave us the vocabulary and the tools to
pursue objectives that furthered both his legal and therapeutic interests. 10
Using arguments and principles from Therapeutic Jurisprudence also taught
our students valuable lessons about the role of lawyers who represent not
just children in mental health facilities, but adults with mental health dis-
abilities, and how to avoid succumbing to paternalistic attitudes and
disempowering practices in representing these clients.1 '
109. Id. at 145-47. Melton states that
[tjhe ethical imperative of respect for persons is sufficient to require rigorous due
process in any infringement of liberty and privacy. Even if that were not the case,
however, it should come as no surprise that fair procedure has therapeutic meaning and
effect. Respect for personal privacy is in itself significant in individuation and a sense
of self-efficacy and control. Similarly, ensuring that children are heard increases the
probability that attention will be given to their concerns ... and that children will be
psychologically invested in the treatment plan.
Id. (citations omitted),
110. See Gould & Perlin, supra note 20, at 355-65 (describing the uses of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence in teaching students empathy, interpersonal skills, ethical analysis, and institutional cri-
tique, as well as traditional trial advocacy and legal theory skills, in the law school clinic or the
externship program that provides legal representation to civil commitment patients).
111. See Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 96 (arguing that civil commitment hearings
should be restructured to enhance patients' perceptions of fairness, participation, and dignity, and
describing the roles of lawyers, judges and clinicians in furthering this process); see Michael L.
Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks ": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L.
REv. 683 (2003) (describing the role of clinical legal education in training law students who rep-
resent patients with mental disabilities in civil commitment proceedings to infuse Therapeutic
Jurisprudence into the teaching process that allows them to discuss strategies for avoiding
"sanist" behaviors and attitudes on the part of teacher, student, court personnel, other lawyers,
witnesses, and the other parties to the proceedings); see Anthony v. Alfieri, Disabled Clients,
Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769 (1992) (criticizing lawyering strategies that paternalis-
tically depict the disabled client as victim, physically dependent, incompetent, and therefore so-
cially devalued); see also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 79, at § B-3 Commentary. The Com-
mentary section reports the following:
These Standards do not accept the idea that children of certain ages are 'impaired,'
'disabled,' 'incompetent,' or lack capacity to determine their position in litigation.
Further, these Standards reject the concept that any disability must be globally deter-
mined. Rather, disability is contextual, incremental, and may be intermittent. The
child's ability to contribute to a determination of his or her position is functional, de-
pending upon the particular position and the circumstances prevailing at the time the
position must be determined. Therefore, a child may be able to determine some posi-
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Because of the mental health law provenance of Therapeutic Juris-
prudence, we saw our zealous legal advocacy for our client's legal rights as
entirely compatible with the therapeutic goals of the advocacy." 2 In her
critique of the role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in clinical education, Pro-
fessor Berkheiser cautions that a Therapeutic Jurisprudence lawyer may be
tempted to settle for the goal of "treatment" as opposed to zealously advo-
cating for the client's due process or liberty rights. ' 3 In the context of the
clinic that represents a civil commitment client, there is at least the risk that
the attorney and student will compromise the client's expressed goal of be-
ing free from involuntary restraint or confinement in a facility, by not zeal-
ously advocating for the client's position. But Therapeutic Jurisprudence
clearly does not argue that lawyers should compromise these important in-
terests; nor does it countenance a paternalistic or best interests approach to
the representation of their civil commitment clients.
In our client's case, we saw ourselves as zealous advocates with spe-
cial sensitivity to the therapeutic interests that we were promoting. Our
students met frequently with the client, conducted regular investigations of
his status in the program (which included reviewing the hospital charts to
monitor incidents of seclusion and restraint, and the administration of psy-
chotropic medications), fought to make sure that he was brought to court
for all hearings and that he had an opportunity to testify to the court about
his need for continued commitment, cross-examined hospital and forensic
experts, and argued strenuously at the hearings that DCF needed to con-
sider less restrictive alternatives to hospitalization. While they did not pur-
sue extraordinary remedies, such as filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus (although, in hindsight, given the many months that passed before
our client was finally released from the program, perhaps they should
have), the goals of representation were to obtain the client's discharge to a
less restrictive residential setting as quickly as possible and, concurrently,
to minimize the level of restrictiveness and intrusiveness that George was
tions in the case but not others. Similarly, a child may be able to direct the lawyer with
respect to a particular issue at one time but not at another. This Standard relies on em-
pirical knowledge about competencies with respect to both adults and children.
Id. (citation omitted).
112. Berkheiser, supra note 60, at 1168 ("Although Therapeutic Jurisprudence does not favor
therapeutic ends to the exclusion of others, it does seek to further those ends, if it can do so with-
out 'subordinating due process and justice values."').
113. Id. at 1169 ("For the clinician who is integrating Therapeutic Jurisprudence into his/her
teaching, that conflict arises when the lawyer's role as facilitator of a disposition which promotes
a client's well-being leads to a result different from that of the lawyer in her role as zealous advo-
cate of the client's rights.").
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subjected to while residing in the facility itself."4
Using this double-barreled strategy not only reconciled the advocacy
and therapy goals of the representation. It gave us the opportunity to have
case and class discussions about how to pursue both due process objectives
and therapeutic objectives. In our discussions about George's case, we
used the decisions that our client made and our activity as prompts for "re-
wind exercises" to discuss where we may have miscalculated in pursuing a
particular goal or strategy and what would have been, in hindsight, a more
prudent or therapeutically effective goal or course of action." 5
Toward the end of his nearly two-year stay in the program, George
was given a pass and I was given permission to take him out for lunch. A
student and I took George to a Cuban-Chinese restaurant in a Hialeah strip
mall, and afterwards we visited a dollar store where I bought him a watch
and some art supplies. We talked about the kinds of food he liked, his ex-
periences in foster care before being placed in the hospital, his thoughts and
feelings about his mother, and his hopes and expectations for life outside of
the hospital. For the first time, a personality that had been hiding from me
114. See Civil Commitment Hearing, supra note 96, at 42-43. Winick proposes that
[l]awyers in commitment hearings who take the paternalistic or best interest approach
serve their clients inadequately in a number of respects. They often defer to the expert
witness, performing little or no cross-examination. They frequently fail even to meet
with the client prior to the hearing, or to perform any investigation of the facts that are
alleged to justify the client's need for hospitalization. Many fail to controvert the alle-
gation that the patient is mentally ill. They fail to explore alternatives to hospitaliza-
tion or to obtain benefits for their clients that might avoid its necessity. Some attor-
neys play largely a clerical role, treating their function as just being 'to look through
the paperwork to make sure it is in order, and thus give the false impression that the
client has had the benefit of legal representation.' These lawyers 'roll over' in the
hearing, deferring to the expert and even stipulating to the hospital's allegations and
waiving the client's right to testify.
Id. Subsequent to George's discharge from the residential treatment program, the Florida legisla-
ture amended the statutory framework governing court oversight of foster children committed to
these centers. 2000 Fla. Laws Ch. 265, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.407(5) (2001)). This
statutory change, coupled with the Florida Supreme Court's promulgation of a rule of juvenile
procedure governing the placement of children in residential treatment centers (Amendment to
the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.350, 842 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 2003)), significantly
expanded the court's authority over DCF and the judicial remedies available to children placed by
DCF in these facilities, including the right to be represented by counsel. Professor Winick's ad-
monitions about the poor quality of legal advocacy provided for many clients in civil commitment
hearings should be a cautionary tale to Florida lawyers appointed to represent the interests of
children in proceedings pursuant to rule 8.350.
115. See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots
and Strategies, reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at 65
(discussing the preventive law pedagogical "rewind" technique that gives the teacher and student
the opportunity to "ask what might have been done differently to avoid the legal problem pre-
sented by the case").
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at the start of our relationship began to quietly assert itself. Our attorney-
client relationship was evolving into an attorney-client friendship." 6
Shortly afterward, George was discharged from the program to a
therapeutic foster group home. The transition from a life inside an institu-
tion, where he was closely monitored around the clock, to life in the com-
munity was particularly difficult. I can remember George telling me how
he had learned how to cope with stress in the highly controlled institutional
milieu of the program, but expressing uncertainty about whether he could
cope with the stresses of foster care and school outside of an institution.
Much of our interaction after his discharge occurred in court where he
was summoned to a procession of hearings. The hearings, which his
mother faithfully attended even though she had little chance of ever regain-
ing legal custody, often devolved into emotional tirades between mother
and son. He was probably angry at her for abandoning him to foster care,
embarrassed by her idiosyncratic behavior outside of court, and ashamed of
the bizarre ways she carried on in court.
George experienced many difficulties after leaving institutional care.
Once again he had multiple foster care placements and school placements
and he had multiple court hearings. At the hearings, he aired his growing
disenchantment with his mother's conduct and his intensifying anger at
DCF. This may have provided him with a degree of emotional release, but
did little to assuage his deepening resentment of his mother and his grow-
ing hatred of the system.
During his last months as a ward of the state, he pleaded with our
Clinic to file a petition for emancipation so that he could be free at last
from DCF dominion and control. We resisted doing so, because we knew
that it would result in him being rendered ineligible for financial assistance
and other benefits from DCF beyond his eighteenth birthday and because
we knew that his judge would likely deny his request to "remove the dis-
ability of nonage."".7
116. The literature on lawyer as friend has many facets and dimensions. See, e.g., Charles
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060, 1087 (1976) (proposing a model for lawyer-client relationships in which the lawyer as
the client's legal friend and accords the client "special indulgences"); see also Linda G. Mills,
Affective Lawyering: The Emotional Dimensions of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in
PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at 421-22 (proposing an affective
model of lawyer-client relations, a psychology-based approach to lawyering in which the lawyer
acknowledges and works through emotional, financial, political, or cultural differences with the
client by providing the client the appropriate affective or emotional responses to address the range
of emotions (anger, frustration, despair or indifference) that legal interactions typically evoke in
clients).
117. See FLA. STAT. § 743.015 (2003) (describing the statutory criteria for a court order re-
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Despite our admonitions, George pleaded repeatedly for a hearing on
his request to be emancipated. We scheduled such a hearing approximately
two months before he turned eighteen. At the hearing, our student intern
elicited testimony from George about his capacity to live on his own. At
the time our client was living in a foster home, attending school each day,
and working after school, earning a few dollars at a small business in a lo-
cal flea market where he used his artistic talent to create tattoos. He had no
savings, no bank account, and no plan to return to post-secondary school
after graduation. Plainly, he was not ready to support himself or live on his
own.
Predictably, his dependency court judge denied the request, finding
that it was not in his best interests to be prematurely emancipated from
DCF custody. While he did not achieve the result that he wanted, giving
George his day in court on the petition for emancipation had palpable
therapeutic benefits for him. The process or dignitary value of the hearing
itself was a worthy goal in and of itself, and giving him his day in court for
the time being placated our client's desire to leave the foster care system
that he so detested. 18
C. THIRD REWIND EXERCISE-GRADUATION:
THE CASE OF THE CAP AND GOWN
One of the most significant examples of the unique relationship that
the Clinic forged with George was our advocacy to compel DCF to pay for
his cap and gown and school yearbook so that he could participate with his
classmates in his high school graduation ceremony.119 The event was laden
with symbolic value and personal meaning for our client. The Clinic's in-
volvement in this rite of passage could not be characterized as traditional
legal advocacy, yet it had deep personal resonance for George. The fact
that he was even eligible to receive a high school diploma was a minor
miracle in view of the many disruptions in his schooling that he experi-
enced during the period of his adolescence that we served as his attorneys.
moving the disability of nonage); see also In re Natasha H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276, 280 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996) (reversing trial court order of emancipation over a foster care adolescent, holding that
the teenager's "misbehavior and lack of cooperation do not justify termination of her dependency
status absent extraordinary circumstances not present here that make it in her best interest to do
so").
118. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 101.
119. Carol Marbin Miller, Cash Tight for Foster Kids Near Graduation: Some Miami Foster
Children Who Are Graduating From High School Have to Go Without a Cap and Gown and
Yearbook Because the State Can't Pay for Them, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 18, 2003, at lB [herein-
after Cash Tight for Foster Kids Near Graduation].
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George's experiences in the public school system were very typical of other
foster children. 2 '
During the three years that our Clinic represented him, George at-
tended over a dozen different secondary schools, and was enrolled in spe-
cial education classes. Reviewing his academic history over the last three
years, I am struck by the extended periods of absence from school, the
many days of school that he missed because of court hearings or other ap-
pointments, the multiple reports by school teachers and officials of disci-
plinary episodes resulting in suspension or other punishment that inter-
rupted his classroom instruction, and the frequent changes of school
placement that corresponded to his frequent changes in foster care place-
ment. All of these turbulent experiences had predictably deleterious conse-
quences for his ability to achieve measurable progress in school. 2'
Most disturbingly, my review of his school records shows repeated
violations by the school district of the legal requirements of federal and
state law designed to ensure stable and appropriate educational services for
foster children. For example, not a single Individual Education Plan (IEP)
that I reviewed contained his mother's signature attesting to her participa-
tion in the process or consenting to his placement in the special education
programs recommended by the school district, as required by federal law.'22
120. See, e.g., Wendy Whiting Blome, What Happens to Foster Kids: Educational Experi-
ences of a Random Sample of Foster Care Youth and a Matched Group of Non-Foster Care
Youth, 14 CHILD. & ADOL. Soc. WORK J. 41 (1997) (longitudinal study (1980-86) comparing
high school and post-high school experiences of foster care youth and a matched group of youth
living with at least one parent finding: foster youth dropped out of high school at a much higher
rate and were significantly less likely to have completed a GED; foster care high school graduates
received significantly less financial assistance for education from their parents or guardians; fos-
ter youth reported more discipline problems in school and experienced more educational disrup-
tion due to changing schools; foster youth were significantly less likely to be in a college prepara-
tory high school track; the adults in the lives of the foster care youth were less likely to monitor
homework, etc.); see also Mason Burley & Mina Halpern, Educational Attainment of Foster
Youth: Achievement and Graduation Outcomes for Children in State Care, available at
http://www.childrensrights.org/Policy/policy-resources-youthcare-eduattainment.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2005) (legislatively funded study reporting lower scores on state achievement tests,
higher dropout rates, more frequent school placement changes, higher likelihood of repeating a
grade or being enrolled in special education classes for foster care youth as compared to non- fos-
ter care youth in Washington State).
121. See, e.g., Memorandum from the School Board of Broward County, Florida, to the
School Board Members (Jan. 29, 2003) (on file with author) (finding that Broward County foster
children were more likely to be classified for Exceptional Student Education and eligible for Free
or Reduced School Lunch; on average began school year twenty days later than non-foster care
students; were more likely to be retained within grade at the end of the previous school year; and
registered lower scores on standardized achievement tests when compared to non-foster care stu-
dents).
122. Two federal laws govern the provision of special services for children with unique edu-
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Nor was there any parental involvement in any decisions regarding psycho-
educational testing or any other significant decisions concerning his receipt
of a "free appropriate public education" under federal law.
1213
These lapses are typical of the way foster children enrolled in excep-
tional student programs experience public school and are among the prime
reasons for the disturbingly poor educational outcomes of these children as
compared to their peers.124 In George's case, the glaring absence of paren-
tal input into any of the special education decisions rendered by school of-
ficials seriously undermined the legitimacy of that process. The lack of any
parental oversight also virtually guaranteed that George would suffer aca-
demic outcomes far worse than those of his peers who have parents to ad-
vocate for them in the school system.'25
Moreover, George himself was systematically excluded from this
process, which certainly had the effect of devaluing him and increasing his
feelings of powerlessness and marginalization1 26 Further setting him apart
cational needs: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2005),
et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005), et seq. Under IDEA and its
implementing regulations, the parent "is the individual who attends the [special education school
placement] meeting and makes the decisions." 34 C.F.R. § 300.344(a)(3) (2003). See also 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(b)(1) (2005) (parent's right to examine records); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2005) (right
to prior written notice of educational changes); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (2005) (right to administrative
due process hearing if parent does not consent to placement); But cf 20 U.S.C. § 1417(c) (2005) (pro-
tecting the rights and privacy of parents and students). The regulations that implement IDEA simi-
larly grant rights to the parent in school proceedings, not to the student. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§
300.504-.505 (2005) (rights to notice and consent); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506 (2005) (right to hearing).
123. See sources cited supra note 122.
124. See generally Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How Exceptional Chil-
dren in Out-of-Home Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 81, 98
(2000). There is a very substantial correlation between children in out-of-home care and children
at-risk for educational problems. Children in foster care have been assessed as having poorer
cognitive abilities and lower levels of academic performance than their peers, often resulting in
placement at below age-appropriate grade level. One study of children in kinship care found that
they scored significantly under peer level in reading, math, and cognitive abilities, and that forty-
one percent of the foster children had been retained at least one grade level. Other studies have
found that children in long-term foster care have a substantially lower chance of performing at or
above grade level than other children. !d at 98-99.
125. Id. at 107 ("Since the special education system is premised on grassroots enforcement by
parents of children's educational rights, the lack of an effective advocate can significantly frus-
trate the ability to receive an adequate and fair referral and subsequent provision of special educa-
tion services.")
126. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Symposium, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging
the "Power of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own," 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
481, 500-01 (2002). Woodhouse asserts that
[ojur constitutional jurisprudence has generally balanced the state's interest in educat-
ing children for citizenship against the right of the parent to control the education of
his own. Missing from the equation has been a conviction that children themselves
have rights-not only rights to equality but also substantive rights to an education that
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from his public school peers, because he was a special education student,
he was not required to take the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test,
the high-stakes test that foster children have difficulties passing. As a con-
sequence many of these students either drop out of school or settle for sub-
standard equivalency or special diplomas. 12 7 Therefore, it was a significant
achievement that he even scored a chance to receive a diploma on the same
stage with his classmates, and that he was able to graduate with a C+ grade
point average.
Even though the bar was lowered, his graduation from high school,
with a special diploma, was never assured. What was certain was that he
would receive a mediocre education and be given an essentially meaning-
less special diploma, and, should he ever seek post-secondary schooling, he
would in all likelihood be required to enroll in remedial classes to help him
acquire basic academic skills that he never acquired in his years of school.
Like many of his foster care peers, George had suffered benign neglect dur-
ing his years in public school.128 It is no wonder, then, that George had lit-
tle interest in furthering his education after graduation.
In rewinding what our Clinic did and what we could have done for
provides them with the tools to survive and thrive and procedural rights that respect
their emerging capacities by honoring their reasonable educational choices.
Id.; see also SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY UNDER THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES
EDUCATION ACT (IDEA) FOR CHILDREN IN THE JUVENILE DELINQUENCY SYSTEM 3-5 (Joseph
B. Tulman & Joyce A. McGee eds., 1998), available at
http://www.fape.org/justice/juv-justice.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2005) (incorporating the child
into the process of developing an IEP is therapeutic and empowering for the child).
127. See Burley & Halpem, supra note 120 (only 59 percent of Washington state foster youth
enrolled in I 11h grade complete high school by the end of grade 12; the completion rate for non-
foster youth in Washington is 86 percent); see also Miriam K. Freedman, Esq., Individuals With
Disabilities Education Law Report, Special Report No. 18 Testing, Grading and Granting Diplo-
mas to Special Education Students (LRP Pub'ns 1997) (summarizing difficulties in providing
reasonable accommodations to students with disabilities in achieving success in statewide stan-
dardized testing and other graduation requirements).
128. As noted above, George's school experiences were very typical of those of his peer
group in state foster care, particularly Florida foster care children, who fare even worse than oth-
ers nationwide. See, e.g., School Board of Broward County, Florida, Interagency Agreement Be-
tween the School Board of Broward County, Florida, The Florida Department of Children and
Families, District 10, and ChildNet, Inc., Evaluation Report, 2003-2004, available at
http://www.broward.kl2.fl.us/research evaluation/Evaluation/DCFFina15-5-04.pdf (last visited
Feb. 9, 2005) (summarizing national foster care educational outcome research literature showing
that foster children frequently move between foster homes and schools while in care, and experi-
ence a high rate of residential mobility subsequent to placement; move from one foster home to
another an average of three times while in the foster care system; and estimating that it takes four
to six months to recover academically from a change in school placement due to the repeated ad-
justment to new teachers, school, curriculum, and expectation with frequent school changes re-
ducing the bond with teachers and peers as well as negatively impacting extracurricular activi-
ties).
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our client in the school arena, two lapses on our part are clear. As was our
standard practice, we routinely reviewed school records and occasionally
communicated our concerns to the school officialdom about academic
needs or problems, but in George's case we did not seize as many opportu-
nities to engage in legal advocacy in this arena as was probably appropri-
ate.'29 For example, we did not take advantage of federal laws intended to
stabilize school placements for homeless students that could have mini-
mized the school changes prompted by his frequent moves from foster
home to foster home around Miami-Dade County. 3 ° Second, we did not
aggressively pursue due process remedies that could have preserved
George's right to attend school on those frequent occasions when school
officials meted out disciplinary sanctions, such as short-term out-of-school
suspensions, against our client for his alleged acts of misconduct in the
special education classroom."3
Studies have shown that children in foster care perform below their
peers in academic assessments, exhibit higher rates of behavior disorders,
and are more frequently absent from school.'32 Had we advocated to re-
duce the amount of time our client missed school, due to disciplinary in-
fractions or changes in foster care placement, we could have helped to im-
prove his educational performance and decrease his maladaptive behaviors.
129. See, e.g., Kathleen McNaught, Education Advocacy in Child Welfare Cases: Key Issues
and Roles, 21 A.B.A. CHILD. L. PRAC. 129 (Nov. 2002) (describing advocacy in school proceed-
ings on behalf of foster care children); Kathleen McNaught, Education Law Primer for Child
Welfare Professionals (Part One), 22 A.B.A. CHILD. L. PRAC. 1 (Mar. 2003) (describing key fed-
eral education laws and rights affecting children in foster care including a right to education,
school records and information, children with disabilities, and school discipline); Kathleen
McNaught, Education Law Primer for Child Welfare Professionals (Part Two), 22 A.B.A.
CHILD. L. PRAC. 17, 22-25 (Apr. 2003) (describing laws relating to education of homeless chil-
dren, young children, and teenagers); Kathleen McNaught, Creative Ways to Meet Education
Needs of Children in Foster Care, 23 A.B.A. CHILD. L. PRAC. 17 (Apr. 2004) (describing promis-
ing approaches to education advocacy for children in the foster care system); KATHLEEN
MCNAUGHT, LEARNING CURVES: EDUCATION ADVOCACY FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE
(2004).
130. See, e.g., McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1143la(2)(B)(i)
(2005), amended by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1031, et seq., 115
Stat. 1425 (2001) (defining "homeless children and youths" to include "children and youth who
are ... living in emergency or transitional shelters; are abandoned in hospitals; or are awaiting
foster care placement").
131. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (setting forth minimal due process safeguards
for students suspended for ten days or less). See also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (prohib-
iting indefinite expulsion of a special education student if the misconduct is a manifestation of the
student's disability); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2005); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.519-.529 (2005) (requiring
school to convene a "manifestation hearing" before a student with a disability is suspended for
more than 10 days cumulatively in a school year).
132. See generally Godsoe, supra note 124, at 98.
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These changes could have aided in a successful transition to employment or
higher education following graduation from high school and discharge
from foster care.'33
Despite our lack of proactive attention to George's educational needs,
the assistance that we provided in making it possible for him to participate
with his high school classmates in their commencement exercise was an
important symbolic gesture of great meaning to him. It involved both
courtroom advocacy and the use of the media to ensure that George, like
his twelfth grade classmates, would have a cap and gown to wear, and
could afford to pay for his school yearbook. 3 a
After promising our client and the other graduating seniors in the Mi-
ami-Dade foster care program that it would provide each of them $500 in
graduating expenses, the Department of Children and Families ("DCF")
cruelly withdrew its offer to help them pay for these expenses. After the
DCF district administrator rebuffed our attempted contact, our students and
I brought the issue to the attention of George's juvenile court judge. The
judge promptly ordered DCF officials to show cause why they should not
be held in criminal contempt "for refusing to help foster kids participate in
the pomp and circumstance of graduation."'35
The attention of the media not only prompted swift action by the
court, and a quick retraction of its position by the DCF, it also brought
about an outpouring of sentiment from the readers of the newspaper, who
were moved by George's story (accompanied by a pensive photograph of
our client appearing next to the published article). Nearly $750 in cash
gifts poured into our Clinic from the public, which we donated to the local
Guardian ad Litem program's Voices for Children Foundation, to help
other high school seniors pay for their graduation expenses.
The Miami Jackson High School commencement exercises took place
133. See, e.g., Robert H. Ayasse, Addressing the Needs of Foster Children: The Foster Youth
Social Services Program, 17 SOCIAL WORK IN EDUC. 207 (October 1995) (reporting on an Ore-
gon study finding that children who experienced multiple foster care placements during a school
year had a lower chance of being above grade level or having opportunities to participate in ex-
tracurricular activities at school than students in more stable long-term foster care placements);
see also FESTINGER, supra note 2, at 276 (reporting the experiences of foster children who opined
that foster care shifts, whey they necessitated transfers to new schools, interfered with their pro-
gress in school). In recognition of the need to attend to the educational needs of children in state
care, the Florida legislature in 2004 enacted a first-of-its-kind measure that now requires system-
atic collaborative efforts between child welfare entities and school systems in order to facilitate
more educational services for foster children. 2004 Fla. Laws ch. 356 (creating FLA. STAT. §
39.0016 (2004)).
134. See Cash Tight for Foster Kids Near Graduation, supra note 119.
135. Id.
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in mid-June at the Miami Beach Convention Center. Not a single family
member or representative from DCF attended or celebrated this event with
George. Only our student intern, Chad Shimel, and the Clinic's associate
director, Carolyn Salisbury, were there to mark this event with George.
Our student brought his camera and took several photographs of our client
in his regalia at the ceremony. In these photos, George is smiling with
more pride and satisfaction than at any time in the three years that I was his
attorney.
While this activity could not be described as traditional legal advo-
cacy, our Clinic's participation in these events unquestionably boosted
George's self-image by letting him see how strongly these adults in his life
believed in him and were willing to celebrate with him in this authentic rit-
ual of passing from childhood to adulthood.'36 In many ways, it was the
most significant personal act or human gesture on the part of our Clinic to-
ward George in the three years that we served as his attorney.
Graduation was also in many ways a transformative experience for
him in that it bolstered his self-esteem and reinforced positive feelings
about himself. Moreover, it symbolized the broadened conception of child
advocacy when taught and practiced with a Therapeutic Jurisprudence per-
spective. This conception sees the lawyer as more than the client's law en-
forcer who intervenes in the child's life to advance his legal rights, but as a
transformative agent who promotes the client's psychological well-being
by helping him to mature, build self-efficacy, and achieve his full poten-
tial.' 37
D. FOURTH REWIND EXERCISE-POSTSCRIPT TO FOSTER CARE:
LEAVING THE SYSTEM
Unfortunately, as he turned age eighteen in the summer of 2004,
George's growing anger and rage at the system that had deprived him of a
136. See SHIRK & STANGLER, supra note 1, at 259-60 (stressing the importance of facilitating
a foster youth's connections to a knowledgeable and caring adult and viewing positive mentoring
for foster care youth as a worthwhile strategy to help foster these connections); see also Mangold,
supra note 28, at 876 ("For children exiting care with no committed adult caretaker, mentors
could play a vital role in providing some parental support in the difficult transition from care.").
137. See Redefining the Role, supra note 52, at 287 (noting that client-centered lawyering, like
'client-centered therapy,' as conceived by psychologist Carl Rogers, is "based on the premise that
individuals can achieve their full potential for self-actualization when facilitated by a relationship
with a helping person who is genuine, empathic, and nonjudgmental."). Our Clinic's mission is
consistent with this client-centered vision. We perceive our mission as not just to train our stu-
dents to use the legal system to protect or expand their clients' rights and interests, but to teach
students interpersonal skills that will help their clients develop self-sufficiency, a sense of valida-
tion, and self-efficacy.
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normal childhood erupted. He wanted nothing more to do with DCF and
the legal system because he regarded it as one that punishes and sanctions.
As the last of his Clinic legal interns summed up this feeling in his weekly
journal: "It is possible that this sense of fear and hatred for the legal sys-
tem has resulted from a lack of Therapeutic Jurisprudence."
1 38
Against our advice, George opted to turn away from DCF and decided
to forgo financial and medical benefits from the state as well as the chance
to enroll in a post-secondary school program tuition-free. This decision
struck our student as an emblem of the failure of his DCF experience:
The idea of judges trying to help children to understand the legal sys-
tem, and allow them to participate in it to create a sense of satisfaction
with the result would certainly help many of the children at the clinic.
For example, George C. is a classic example of a child who has grown
to despise the system that really should be helping him. From the sev-
eral times that I have seen and spoken with George, it is quite apparent
that he wants nothing more to do with the legal system and thinks of it
only as a system that punishes and sanctions. It is possible that this
sense of fear and hatred for the legal system has resulted due to a lack
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence. I can't be certain as I am unfamiliar
with George's entire history; however, it seems quite possible that few
judges, social workers, or DCF employees and attorneys have ever lis-
tened to what he has to say. As a result, he has grown to hate many of
the programs that are supposed to be helping him. In fact, he is very
reluctant to take advantage of the opportunity for a free college educa-
tion simply because it would be provided by those he has grown to
hate. There is certainly something wrong with this picture.
139
In our group meetings I asked myself and the students whether
George's unwillingness to heed our advice also reflected the failure of our
Clinic to provide him more effective counsel. We questioned whether we
had fallen short in using Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive lawyer-
ing to help him appreciate the benefits of the post-eighteen services avail-
able to him. We asked whether he had weighed the benefits against the
risks of making an unwise choice.'40
138. Clinic Weekly Journal, supra note 17.
139. Clinic Weekly Journal, supra note 17 (emphasis added).
140. The Clinic's self-professed "failure" to counsel the client to make a "wise" choice with
respect to his post- 18 eligibility for state and federal benefits may be a natural and inevitable con-
sequence of the client-centered counseling model that we use in our Clinic. See supra note 137
and accompanying text. The premise of this model is that individuals can achieve their full po-
tential for self-actualization when facilitated by a relationship with a helping person who is genu-
ine, empathic, and nonjudgmental. See Client Denial, supra note 99. See also Dinerstein, supra
note 99, at 512 (noting that the core argument supporting client decision-making is that it en-
hances the client's individual autonomy, meaning "that a person can choose and act freely, ac-
cording to her own life plan").
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There were many difficulties in conveying to our client the risks that
he assumed by refusing the benefits available to him under federal and state
law. It would do us no good to lecture our client or to reel off a litany of
statistics about imprisonment, welfare dependency, institutionalization and
the other grim experiences of many of the 20,000 youths emancipated from
state care each year. These appeals would surely fall on deaf ears and pos-
sibly only engender more resistance from our client.
It soon became obvious that there had to be a better way to counsel
our embittered and distrustful client, on the cusp of adulthood, to overcome
what we regarded as his obstinate and defiant refusals of help. We saw the
need to use all of the counseling tools that we could muster to help him ac-
knowledge the difficulties that he would face and to be willing to consider
accepting some state aid as he made the difficult transition from foster care
to adulthood."' We would have to find a way to help him see the risks of
rejecting state aid on his own terms. '4
Two weeks before George's eighteenth birthday, two students (our
legal intern and social work intern) and I took him out for lunch to discuss
these questions.'43 We spent nearly four hours with him, calmly discussing
141. See, e.g., In re Natasha H., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279-80. The Natasha H. court observed
that
[o]bstinacy and defiance test the patience of adults charged with the tending to the
needs of minor children. Under the trial court's reasoning the more obstinate the child
the greater the justification for terminating jurisdiction. We disagree. As much as the
minor might wish to be rid of court supervision, as frustrating as her conduct might be
to DHHS and the court, her misbehavior and lack of cooperation do not justify termi-
nation of her dependency status absent extraordinary circumstances not present here
that make it in her interest not to do so.
Id. See also Kathi Grasso, Litigating the Independent Living Case, 18 A.B.A. CHILD. L. PRAC. 65
(July 1999) (discussing different lawyer counseling strategies unique to the representation of
older foster youth).
142. See BINDER, supra note 99, at 7 (concluding that "when it comes to making decisions
about what solutions are most likely to be satisfactory.., as 'owners' of legal problems, clients
deserve the right to determine how great a risk they are willing to ran with respect to possible
outcomes.").
143. The Clinic occasionally hosts MSW interns from the Florida International University
School of Social Work who assist legal interns in their cases as part of their field experience prac-
ticum. Our graduate social work intern in George's case during the summer 2004 session was
particularly adept at utilizing techniques from Therapeutic Jurisprudence in her work with our
client, which greatly enhanced our law student's ability to establish a more effective, culturally-
competent relationship with him. For example, in her first meeting with him, she gave him a pen
and a drawing pad and encouraged him to sketch while they talked. She also concurred with our
legal intern that George's unwillingness to consider benefits from DCF stemmed from his deeply
held feelings about the way his caseworkers and other professionals in the system had excluded
him and treated him with disrespect him during his many years as a client of DCF, which she saw
as an affront to her own developing ethical and professional values as a social worker. The com-
plementary insights of our legal and social work interns were one of many reasons why the clini-
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before and over lunch his future life plans after his emancipation from DCF
care. Despite all of our entreaties and pleas, he adamantly refused to con-
sider opting for any DCF benefits. We were disappointed that he once
again said no. Where had we failed our client, I asked? What could we do
or say differently to spark our client's intrinsic motivation to consider some
of the benefits available to him?
In hindsight, as I rewound our final lunch conversation with our cli-
ent, I considered other counseling approaches that we could have used to
talk to and motivate him. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and preventive law,
relying on empirical research from other disciplines such as social work
and behavioral, cognitive, and social psychology, would seem to provide us
the prescriptive tools and psychologically-informed strategies to more ef-
fectively counsel a client as "difficult" and recalcitrant as George.
The empirical research on intrinsic motivation, persuasion, and moti-
vational interviewing, used by professionals in fields as varied as addictive
behavior and health care compliance, and by judges in problem solving
courts, would seem to offer valuable prescriptive tools to spark motivation
in our client to make the right choice.'" Instead of having an unstructured,
meandering conversation with George, which frustrated us and engendered
more resistance in our client, there were surely other persuasive, non-
coercive, empathic techniques that we could have used to encourage
George to elect on his own terms to enroll in post-secondary school and opt
for post-foster care financial assistance from DCF.
In his article on the interpersonal skills and motivational interviewing
techniques used by judges with offenders in problem solving courts, Pro-
fessor Bruce Winick offers a number of research-based suggestions which
could be adapted to the kind of conversation we were having with our cli-
ent.'45 There are differences between our client, who was motivated by a
desire to be free from DCF and the court, and criminal offenders who are
brought to court because of alcohol, substance abuse, domestic violence,
cal experience was a pedagogically enriched by the interdisciplinary collaboration. See generally
Carolyn Hopps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 133
(2004) (presenting recommendations from the social work and counseling professions for teach-
ing cultural competency in law school); David B. Wexler, Some Thoughts and Observations on
the Teaching of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 35 REv. DER. P.R. 273, 286-87 (1996) (describing
possibilities of university-wide graduate level interdisciplinary instruction in Therapeutic Juris-
prudence in which law students and graduate behavioral science students participate jointly in
internships and classroom discussions).
144. Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1055, 1078-82 (2003) [hereinafter Problem Solving Courts].
145. Id. at 1080-82.
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mental health or child abuse problems. The techniques described by Pro-
fessor Winick offer a number of practical approaches to counseling and in-
terviewing that we could have deployed in George's case perhaps more
successfully than some of the methods that we used. Moreover, the tech-
niques that he suggests could motivate George to make positive choices to
avoid criminal court in the future, a particularly significant goal for some-
one with a history of fifteen unpleasant years as a ward of the juvenile
court.
Professor Winick argues that judges in problem solving courts serve
primarily as psychosocial or therapeutic agents, and thus need to under-
stand and apply principles of psychology and behavioral sciences in inter-
acting with the individuals who appear before them.'46 Many of the pre-
scriptions that Professor Winick offers for problem solving judges, such as
developing enhanced interpersonal skills, treating the client with dignity
and respect, showing empathy, avoiding paternalism, being non-critical and
non-judgmental, creating conditions to forge a genuine alliance with the
client, and using persuasion and not coercion, could be adapted and added
to the counseling repertoire of a Therapeutic Jurisprudence-oriented lawyer
in motivating our stubbornly resistant client to contemplate and bring about
behavioral changes in his life.'47
Professor Winick identifies a number of psychological mechanisms
that may impede communication between the judge and the offender (or the
lawyer and his client).'48 For example, he admonishes judges to be sensi-
tive to issues of transference and counter-transference in their judge-
offender interactions. 49 Transference is a concept first introduced by Freud
in which the patient projects feelings that originated in prior relationships,
particular family relationships, onto the therapist. 5° Counter-transference
involves the analyst's or therapist's projection of feelings onto the patient
that stem from prior relationships.' 5' Just as a judge in a problem solving
146. Id. at 1068.
147. Id. at 1067-78. See also Astrid Birgden, Dealing With the Resistant Criminal Client. A
Psychologically-Minded Strategy for More Effective Legal Counseling, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 225
(2002) (describing a "stages of change" model of client counseling, incorporating motivational
interviewing strategies for criminal defense lawyers and mental health professionals to motivate
resistant clients to change patterns of behavior, derived from psychologically-based research).
148. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1067.
149. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1069-70.
150. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1069-70 (referencing Marjorie A. Silver,
Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L.
REv. 259 (1999), reprinted in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 14, at
357).
151. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1069-70.
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court should be sensitive to the potential for transference to occur on the
part of the offender, so should the judge be aware of the possibility that he
will project his own negative feelings onto the offender.'52
In the frustrating lunch conversation that we had with George about
his future plans, I realize now that I was not as conscious of the occurrence
of this psychological phenomenon as I should have been at the time and
this was a significant reason for our failure to communicate. I assumed far
too much of a paternalistic tone with George, treating him more as a son or
younger brother than as a client.'53 I was also too judgmental in not trust-
ing my client to display the mature or capable judgments needed to assess
what risks were worth taking and not trusting him to make his own choices
based on his knowledge of the risks that they entailed.
In a sense, despite all the talk of empathy and all of the lip service that
I gave to client-centeredness and client autonomy, I disregarded his values
and experiences and distrusted his ability to make an informed choice, just
as I might disregard my own pre-teenage son's views and choices regarding
which extra-curricular program to enroll in or what summer camp to attend.
This paternalistic attitude on my part, which was probably a manifestation
of unacknowledged counter-transference in my interactions with him, may
have produced a degree of resistance or psychological reactance on his part
that I failed at the time to recognize as an obstacle to effective communica-
tion with George.'54
What was also missing from that last conversation with George was a
well-informed concept of how to use the lawyer-client interviewing and
counseling process to motivate our client to remain in school and accept
some help from DCF, without putting coercive pressure on him to make
choices that we were recommending (or perhaps insisting) he make.'55 As
152. See Mills, supra note 116, at 370-74 (discussing the complex dimensions, and potential
dangers, of counter-transference when manifested in the lawyer-client relationship).
153. See Nancy W. Perry & Larry L. Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-CourtExamina-
tion of Children: Practical Approaches, 18 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1369, 1379-80 (1985). Perry and
Teply observe that
[flor most legal interviewing and counseling purposes, a parent-child relationship will
be unproductive. It supplies only a low level of motivation to cooperate. Furthermore,
'decisions' reached without a collaborative effort are judgments that reflect the attor-
ney's values, which are not necessarily the same as the child's. Such decisions are less
likely to be ones that the child will be satisfied with or that the child will follow in the
long-run.
Id.
154. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1070 (citing SHARON S. BREHM & JACK W.
BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 13 (1981)).
155. The recent research by the MacArthur Network on Mental Health and the Law, and par-
ticularly the findings regarding coercion, supports this view. The MacArthur Network research
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Bruce Winick has explained, in the context of juveniles facing involuntary
civil commitment to mental health programs, research on the psychology of
choice "suggests that people perform more effectively and with greater mo-
tivation when they choose voluntarily to do something, and perform less
well, with poor motivation and sometimes with psychological reactance,
when they are coerced into doing it.'
56
While it is perfectly appropriate for the attorney (or the judge in the
problem solving court) to communicate to the client (or the offender) the
attorney's or judge's views concerning the individual's best interests, ulti-
mately it is best to cede that choice to the individual. In order for us to
have the confidence that our client would ultimately succeed in post-
secondary school and succeed as a participant in post-foster care DCF pro-
grams, we had to simply let go, let our client arrive at his own choice, and
rely on his intrinsic motivation to sign himself up for school, apply for
post-foster care Road to Independence Program benefits, and succeed (or
fail) in these programs on his own terms.
By contrast, if he felt coerced or compelled to participate in these pro-
grams because of extrinsic motivation imposed on him by our Clinic, then
it was less likely that he would internalize the program goals and succeed
in the school and post-foster care programs. As the social work research on
"youth engagement" shows, involving young people in the foster care sys-
tem in the "creation of their own destinies" means "involving them in case
planning and encouraging them to advocate for themselves."' 57 The attor-
ney or social worker who facilitates this youth engagement in the case
planning process can lay out the alternative choices for the client, present
information to the client about the alternatives, but in the end it is only the
youth himself who can then exercise choice, develop the plan, and create
his own destiny.
examined the correlates and determinants of individuals' perceptions of what makes them feel
coerced. The findings from the data indicated that patients in civil commitment hearings who are
provided with procedural justice, who are treated with dignity and respect and accorded voice and
validation in the civil commitment process, will experience the commitment that they have con-
sented to as voluntary, rather than coerced, and as a result, will experience the psychological
benefits of choice and avoid the negative benefits of coercion. See Problem Solving Courts, su-
pra note 144, at 1077; see also Bruce J. Winick & Ken Kress, Outpatient Commitment: A Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 107, 112 (2003) [hereinafter Outpa-
tient Commitment]; supra note 53 and accompanying text.
156. See Outpatient Commitment, supra note 155, at 112.
157. See SHIRK & STANGLER, supra note 1, at 260 (noting that in focus group surveys of for-
mer foster care youth conducted in 2001 by the Jim Casey Youth Opportunities Initiative, "many
of the participants said they felt that those in charge of their lives devalued their opinions and de-
sires and had low expectations for their success. The advice they gave was virtually unanimous:
'Nothing about us without us."').
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Lastly, our conversation with George did not avail itself of the per-
suasion theory research to prompt our client to examine his past and was
unable to spark his motivation to undergo a change with regard to his future
willingness to accept more schooling and DCF benefits. Winick notes that
psychological research on persuasion has identified the elements of the per-
suasion process and deduced that "the content of [a] message, and the way
it is delivered, significantly influence the likelihood of persuasion."'58 The
research on persuasion theory has postulated that the degree of success in
persuading a person is determined by the extent to which the receiver of in-
formation "is actively involved in the processing of the information pre-
sented." 59 As argued above, we might have been able to persuade our cli-
ent to consider school and DCF had he been more actively involved in
considering the different options that we presented to him.
As Winick points out, the "elaboration likelihood model" of persua-
sion gives the recipient of the message "the opportunity to ask questions
about their options, the freedom to engage in their own processing of the
information, and the freedom to reach their own decision."'6 ° This model
"is similar to the motivational interviewing technique developed for use by
clinicians to help ... individuals" deal with and overcome problems of al-
coholism and drug addiction. 6' Our client's most intractable problem, in
the context of our last conversation with him, was not drug addiction or al-
coholism but his deep distrust of both DCF and the school system. This
distrust was the product of his long childhood in the custody of DCF,
which subjected him to years of institutional neglect and maltreatment, and
the benign neglect that he suffered during his years in the school system.
Also, had he been helped and represented by a lawyer during the many
years that he suffered these indignities all alone, he might not have experi-
enced these profound feelings of distrust.
Borrowing from the research on motivational interviewing methods
used to prepare individuals to change addictive behavior, Winick suggests
five interviewing techniques that problem solving courts can utilize to
spark motivation in offenders. 162 Each of these techniques has direct appli-
158. See Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1079, (citing DANIEL J. O'KEEFE,
PERSUASION: THEORY AND RESEARCH 130-88 (1990)).
159. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1079 (citing RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T.
CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO
ATTITUDE CHANGE 1-60 (1986)).
160. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1079.
161. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1080 (citing WILLIAM R. MILLER &
STEPHEN ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING: PREPARING PEOPLE TO CHANGE
ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 51-63 (1991))
162. Problem Solving Courts, supra note 144, at 1080-81 (citing MILLER & ROLLNICK, at 55-
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cation to the attomey-client counseling process. In working with our client
to overcome this understandable, deep-rooted distrust of these institutions,
first we needed to understand his feelings and perspectives without judging,
criticizing or blaming.
Second, we needed to seek to develop discrepancies between his pre-
sent views and his important personal goals and objectives (e.g., to explain,
in a non-judgmental and non-confrontational way, that he could achieve his
personal goal of using his artistic talents to support himself if he enrolled in
a technical or post-secondary art school, rather than working at a flea mar-
ket tattoo parlor for very little remuneration). We could create motivations
for change on our client's part only when he himself perceived the discrep-
ancy between his present plan (of rejecting DCF aid, even if it was a means
to helping him become self-sufficient) and the achievement of his personal,
long-term goal of being able to support himself and be free from the power
and control of DCF over his life.
163
Third, we needed to avoid arguing with our client, which would be
counterproductive and engender defensiveness on his part. Fourth, when
we encountered resistance, we needed to "roll" with it, rather than become
confrontational. This means listening to our client with empathy and pro-
viding feedback to what he was saying by introducing new information
(e.g., using our social work intern's research to identify an appealing art
program near his home and offering to help him enroll in that program).
Fifth, we needed to foster self-efficacy in our client."6 Had the Clinic
been more aware, in our conversation with George about his post-foster
care options, of the innovative techniques of motivational interviewing
used by clinicians and problem solving judges to motivate change in the
lives of criminal offenders with addiction or alcohol problems, we might
have succeeded in that final attorney-client conversation in persuading him
to enroll in a school program and apply for DCF benefits.1
65
62).
163. See Client Denial, supra note 99, at 327; see also Birgden, supra note 147, at tbl. 2 (rais-
ing doubt and creating "dissonance" about the appropriateness of the client's present behavior, in
order to highlight the discrepancy between the client's present behavior and the client's goals,
posited as counseling techniques used by lawyers and mental health professionals to motivate
change in resistant clients).
164. See A. BANDURA, SELF EFFICACY: THE EXERCISE OF CONTROL (1997) (describing self-
efficacy as self-appraisal about how well one can perform actions to deal with a situation, and as
a dynamic process that increases as the individual gains new skills to manage threatening situa-
tions).
165. In rewinding what went wrong at this juncture of our representation, and what we could
have done differently, in retrospect, perhaps we should have cemented the counseling process by
encouraging George to enter into a form of behavioral contract with his school and DCF, in effect
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George would not attempt to change unless he himself achieved the
self-realization that he could reach his goal, overcome barriers and obsta-
cles to its achievement, and succeed in effectuating positive change in his
life. To motivate him to change his present life plan and to reach his goal
of self-sufficiency, we needed to build on his personal strengths (e.g., his
love of drawing and art), and then encourage him to use that strength to ef-
fectuate positive change in his life. 
166
V. CODA: WHAT IS RIGHT WITH THIS PICTURE?
This leads us to a word about endings. A case study needs an end, if
only as a point of decision to prompt discussion. But actually, there is
no end, only breaking points and partial resolutions. A million things
could happen .... The case study does offer a useful clue to the arti-
fice of endings .... The lawyers at some point withdraw because, af-
ter all, it is the client's life. If their lens is wide, they leave this and
every case with secrets, ironies, and, perhaps, a story to tell. 1
67
After three years of serving as his attomeys, striving to represent him
with an ethic of care, why was it so difficult for our Clinic to convince
George to accept an offer of aid from the state? Why was he so intent on
using non-coercive reinforcements, such as the promise of financial assistance based on his suc-
cessful participation in a program rather than making hollow appeals to "reason" about the impor-
tance of school and financial aid from DCF to his future.
Indeed, as Bruce Winick has contended, research in behavioral, cognitive and social psy-
chology suggests that techniques such as behavioral contracting with our client might have been
stronger and more positive motivators or incentives to promote his interest in staying in school
and opting for the various financial and other benefits, rather than our abstract entreaties to sign
up for school so that he could be a Road to Independence client. See Bruce J. Winick, Harness-
ing the Power of the Bet: Wagering With the Government As a Mechanism for Social and Indi-
vidual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 793-97 (1991) (suggesting the use of preventive law
through behavioral contracting with clients to facilitate drug treatment, teach job training skills to
those on welfare, and reduce truancy on the part of public school students).
Unfortunately, the problem with our aborted effort to use this behavioral contract tech-
nique was that our client had spent virtually his entire childhood growing up as a "client" and
never as a child and had lost all trust in the system. It is no wonder that on the day he turned
eighteen, he rejected the offer of a "wager" with DCF which would guarantee him needed finan-
cial assistance. Instead, he packed his belongings in a bag and walked away from the system.
166. See id., at 814-16; Birgden, supra note 147, at tbl. 3 (describing one of the final stages of
change during which it is imperative to support the client's belief in the possibility of change and
support the client in translating intention into action so that he is more likely to have a positive
outcome and experience mastery); Michael D. Clark, Change-Focused Drug Courts: Examining
the Critical Ingredients of Positive Behavior Change, NAT'L DRUG CT. INST. REV. (Winter
2001) (suggesting that interviewing techniques that promote treatment by building on the individ-
ual's strengths are important in treatment efficacy, and that the court and program staff must build
trust and find effective methods to encourage the individual to participate in treatment, affording
the client increased choice and autonomy).
167. Bellow & Minow, supra note 19, at 29.
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George to accept an offer of aid from the state? Why was he so intent on
leaving the system rather than taking advantage of what it could still pro-
vide him, even though his refusal meant that he might end up one day liv-
ing on the streets or locked up? Why was the Clinic unable to reach
George and persuade him to agree to our counsel and advice?'68 I thought
of our student intern's observation, quoted above: "There is certainly
something wrong with this picture."
George's case shows that there is much that is right with the picture.
The Clinic used Therapeutic Jurisprudence to build rapport and trust with
him, and it used the model effectively in advocating for his legal interests,
using legal checkups to help him overcome psycholegal soft spots, and
helping him to build self-efficacy. Teaching Therapeutic Jurisprudence
also gave us the vocabulary to reflect on our work. At each juncture, in
discussions with student interns, we evaluated our legal work through the
Therapeutic Jurisprudence lens, intensively probing the therapeutic or anti-
therapeutic consequences of each decision or strategy.
Of course, practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence expanded upon and
added to the traditional lawyer role of client's law enforcer, and it fostered
more personal interactions with our client, which allowed us to explore the
use of counseling methodologies that built upon his personal strengths and
empowered him, and in the process facilitated his ability to participate as
an equal in the lawyer-client relationship. 169 As the cap and gown story
shows, the broadened focus of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the clinical set-
168. Perhaps, notwithstanding the above-stated view that we facilitated our client's equal par-
ticipation in the attorney-client relationship, it is also possible, as the Fourth Rewind Exercise
shows, that the Clinic's failure here was not one of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, but a failure to
regard the client as an equal or a partner with the lawyer in formulating joint goals and strategies.
See Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Col-
laboration, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 71, 76-88 (1996) (arguing that the need to reconcile the interests
and values of the client with those of the lawyer requires negotiation between the lawyer and the
client about their joint goals and the means of pursuing them).
169. See Martin Guggenheim, A Paradigm for Determining the Role of Counsel for Children,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399, 1407-34 (1996) (conceiving the role of children's lawyers, above all
else, as the enforcers of their client's rights, and describing the principal tasks of counsel for
young children as examining and identifying the relevant legislation and case law in the particular
subject area, and then determining the most effective way to enforce them without the necessity
to seek guidance or involvement from the child). Cf Federle, supra note 20, at 1695-96 (con-
ceiving of the roles of interviewing and counseling as effective mechanisms for facilitating the
child client's full participation in both the legal system and the attorney-client relationship and the
attorney as ethically obligated to meet with the client and discover information about the client's
situation, to foster communication between the lawyer and the child, to utilize whatever tech-
niques may be necessary to accommodate the child client, to free the child from potential domina-
tion by the adult lawyer, and to empower the child in the attorney-client relationship, thus en-
hancing the child's ability to participate in the legal system).
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ting sees the pedagogical mission as not just training students to use the le-
gal system to protect or expand their clients' rights and interests, but also
teaching students to use their interpersonal skills to help their clients de-
velop self-sufficiency, a sense of validation, and self-efficacy.
However, perhaps this was a pyrrhic victory, because George's dis-
trust and hatred of the system made him distrust and reject even his trusted
lawyer's advice almost to the end. I cannot be too harshly self-critical, be-
cause the Clinic did give George some of the self-efficacy tools and self-
sufficiency skills that I hope will serve him well in the future and help him
avoid the dire outcomes that I fear.
George's story tells us that using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a child
advocacy clinic can help clients seize control of and transform their lives.
It tells us that we must trust our clients to make their own choices even if
we think those choices are mistakes and unwise. It tells us that, no matter
what we may think of the choice that our client made, he has some if not all
of the resources that he will need to avoid the bitter results experienced by
so many of the 20,000 youths who each year leave foster care.
After mulling it over for a time after he turned eighteen in August,
George accepted our advice. A few weeks ago, in October, he came into
our office, and told us that he had enrolled in a vocational program, study-
ing to be a chef. This qualified him to receive the monthly stipend from the
Road to Independence Program. A week later, he came into the office,
limping after being struck on his bicycle by a delivery truck, and an-
nounced that he was no longer interested in attending school, which of
course put in jeopardy his continued eligibility for the scholarship and
Medicaid. He was hungry and angry, and talked furiously about his prob-
lems with his mother, who was again using drugs, and about his struggles
to find a job and a place to live. It was the kind of depressing news that I
expected I would hear from him sooner or later, although perhaps not quite
this soon. And yet, I know that this is not the end of George's story. While
this case study ends, George's life is only beginning. 7 '
As this case study shows, when Therapeutic Jurisprudence is inte-
grated with preventive law, the combined approach has much to offer clini-
cal education. We have long regarded our clinic as a laboratory for testing
and studying this approach, particularly with the goal of inculcating an
170. See Spinak, supra note 20, at 2082 ("I keep waiting for the story to end. I forget that
these are lives and the story doesn't end, just the telling.").
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"ethic of care" in our students. 7' As we view the model, we see it as a re-
conceptualization of the approach to skills training-focusing on client in-
terviewing and counseling, developing inter-personal skills with clients,
fact-finding, motion practice, oral advocacy, and presentation of evi-
dence-that have traditionally been the pedagogical goals of clinical legal
education.
By explicitly valuing the psychological well-being of the client, by
calling for enhanced interpersonal skills, and by emphasizing the preven-
tion of legal problems, the model adds a rich new dimension to clinical law
teaching, particularly in the context of representing children. Moreover, by
bringing insights from psychology and social work into our understanding
of the role of counsel for children and other clients, it brings a much needed
interdisciplinary perspective to clinical legal education.
I hope that other law school clinics and other child advocates see the
added benefits that this broadened conception of legal education and the
lawyering process can bring to their respective pedagogical and advocacy
missions and will introduce these skills and values into the classroom,
clinic, and courtroom.
171. Berkheiser, supra note 60, at 1164. This is not to say that inculcating these different val-
ues in the clinical setting is without its perils as a predictor of ultimate career satisfaction. See
Susan Daicoff, Making Law Therapeutic for Lawyers: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive
Law, and the Psychology of Lawyers, 5 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 811, 811-19 (1999) (using psy-
chological data on the personality traits of lawyers to argue that Therapeutic Jurisprudence and
preventive law are particularly well suited for lawyers with certain personality traits atypical of
lawyers generally, such as altruistic, humanistic, or interpersonally oriented values, which have
been empirically linked to career dissatisfaction among lawyers).
